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The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back and Anglo-American Feminism

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This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (1983), edited by Chicana writers Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua, was intended as a collection of essays, poems, tales, and testimonials that would give voice to the contradictory experiences of "women of color." To make explicit this end, the editors wrote:

We are the colored in a white feminist movement.
We are the feminists among the people of our culture.
We are often the lesbians among the straight. (23)

By giving voice to such experiences, each according to her style, the editors and contributors believed they were developing a theory of subjectivity and culture that would demonstrate the considerable difference between Chicana and Anglo-American women, as well as between Anglo-European men and men of their culture.

As a speaking subject of an emergent discursive formation, the writer in Bridge was aware of the displacement of her subjectivity across a multiplicity of discourses: feminist/lesbian, nationalist, racial, and socioeconomic. The peculiarity of her displacement implied a multiplicity of positions from which she was driven to grasp or understand herself and her relations with the real, in the Althusserian sense of the word (Althusser 1971). The writer in Bridge, in part, was aware that these positions were often incompatible or contradictory, and problematic, since many readers would not have access to the maze of discourses competing for her body and her voice. This self-conscious effort to reflect on her "flesh and blood experiences to concretize a vision that [could] begin to heal [their] 'wounded knee'" (23) led many a Bridge speaker to take up a position in conflict with (28) multiple inter- and intracultural discursive interpretations in an effort to come to grips with

"the many-headed demon of oppression" (195).

Since its publication in 1981, *Bridge* has had a diverse impact on feminist writings in the United States. Teresa de Lauretis, for example, claims that *Bridge* has contributed to a "shift in feminist consciousness" (1987, 10), although her explanation fails to clarify what the shift consists of and for whom. There is little doubt, however, that *Bridge* along with eighties writings by many women of color in the United States has problematized many a version of Anglo-American feminism and has helped open the way for alternate feminist discourses and theories.

Presently, however, the impact among most Anglo-American theorists appears to be more cosmetic than not because, as Jane Flax has recently noted, "The modal 'person' in feminist theory still appears to be a self-sufficient individual adult" (1987, 640). This particular "modal person" corresponds to the female subject most admired in Western literature which Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has characterized as the one who "articulates herself in shifting relationship to . . . the constitution and 'interpellation' of the subject not only as individual but as 'individualist'" (1985, 243-44). Consequently, the "native female" or "woman of color" can be excluded from the discourse of feminist theory. The 'native female,' the object of colonialism and racism, is excluded because, in Flax's terms, white feminists have not "explored how our understanding of gender relations, self, and theory are partially constituted in and through experiences of living in a culture in which asymmetric race relations are a central organizing principle of society" (1987, 640).

It is clear that the most popular subject of Anglo-American feminist theorizing is an autonomous, self-making, self-determining subject who first proceeds according to the logic of identification with regard to the subject of consciousness, a notion usually viewed as the purview of man, but now claimed for women (see Kristeva 1981, 19). And believing that in this respect she is the same as man, she now claims the right to pursue her own identity, to name herself, to pursue self-knowledge, and in the words of Adrienne Rich to effect "a change in the concept of sexual identity" (1979, 35)

Though feminism has problematized gender relations as "the single most important

advance in feminist theory" (Flax 1987, 627i, it has not problematized the subject of knowledge and her complicity with the notion of consciousness as "synthetic unificatory power, the centre and active point of organization of representations determining their concatenation" (Pecheux 1982, 122). The subject (and object) of knowledge is now a woman, but the inherited view of consciousness has not been questioned at all. As (29) a result some Anglo-American feminist subjects of consciousness have tended to become a parody of the masculine subject of consciousness, thus revealing their ethnocentric liberal underpinnings.

In 1982 Jean Bethke Elshtain noted the "masculine cast" of radical feminist language, specifically citing the terms of "raw power, brute force, martial discipline, law and order with a feminist face—and voice" (6II). Also in critiquing liberal feminism and its language, she wrote that "no vision of the political community that might serve as the groundwork of a life in common is possible within a political life dominated by a selfinterested, predatory individualism" (6I7~. Althusser has argued that this tradition "has privileged the category of the 'subject' as Origin, Essence and Cause, responsible in its internality for all determinations of the external object. In other words, this tradition has promoted Man, in his ideas and experience, as the source of knowledge, morals and history" (cited by MacDonell 1986,76~. By identifying in this way with this tradition, standpoint epistemologists have substituted, ironically, woman for man.

This logic of identification as a first step in constructing the theoretical subject of feminism is often veiled from standpoint epistemologists because greater attention is given to naming female identity and describing women's ways of knowing as being considerably different than men's.² By emphasizing 'sexual difference,' a second step takes place, often called oppositional thinking (counteridentifying). However, this gendered standpoint epistemology leads to feminism's bizarre relationship with other liberation movements, working inherently against the interests of ni~nwhite women and no one else.

Sandra Harding, for example, argues that oppositional thinking (counteridentification) with white men should be retained even though "There are suggestions in the literature of Native Americans, Africans, and Asians that what

feminists call feminine versus masculine personalities, ontologies, ethics, epistemologies, and world views may be what these other liberation movements call non-Western versus Western personalities and world views.... I set aside the crucial and fatal complication for this way of thinking—the fact that one half of these people are women and that most women are not Western" (1986, 659~. She further suggests that feminists respond by relinquishing the totalizing "master theory" character of our theory making: "This response to the issue (will manage) to retain the categories of feminist theory . . . and simply set them alongside the categories of the theory making of other subjugated groups.... Of course, it leaves bifurcated (and perhaps even more finely divided) the identities of all except ruling-class white Western women" (1986, 6601, The apperception of this situation is precisely what led to the choice of title for the book *All the (30) Blacks are Men, All the Women are White, But some of us are Brave*, edited by Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith (1982~.

Notwithstanding the power of *Bridge* to affect the personal lives of its readers, *Bridge's* challenge to the Anglo-American subject of feminism has yet to effect a newer discourse. Women of color often recognize themselves in the pages of *Bridge* and write to say "The women writers seemed to be speaking to me, and they actually understood what I was going through. Many of you put into words feelings I have had that I had no way of expressing.... The writings just)ified some of my thoughts telling me I had a right to feel as I did" (Moraga, Foreword to the second edition). However, Anglo feminist readers of *Bridge* tend to appropriate it, cite it as an instance of difference between women, and proceed to negate that difference by subsuming women of color into the unitary category of woman/women. The latter is often viewed as the "common denominator" (De Lauretis 1986, I 4), between us, though it is forgotten that it is our "common denominator" in an oppositional (counteridentifying) discourse with some white men that leaves us unable to explore relationships among women.

Bridge's writers did not see the so-called "common denominator" as the solution for the construction of the theoretical feminist subject. In the call for submissions the editors clearly stated: "We want to express to all women—especially to white middle class women—the experiences which divide us as feminists; we want to

examine the incidents of intolerance, prejudice and denial of differences within the feminist movement. We intend to explore the causes, and sources of, and solutions to these divisions. We want to create a definition that expands what 'feminist' means to us" (Moraga and Anzaldua, Introduction to the first edition, xxiii). Thus, the female subject of *Bridge* is highly complex. She is and has been constructed in a crisis-of-meaning situation which includes racial and cultural divisions and conflicts. The psychic and material violence that gives shape to that subjectivity cannot be underestimated nor passed over lightly. The fact that not all of this violence comes from men in general but also from

women renders the notion of "common denominator" problematic.

It is clear, however, that even as *Bridge* becomes a resource for the Anglo-American feminist theory of classroom and syllabus, there's a tendency to deny differences if these differences pose a threat to the "common denominator" category. That is, solidarity would be purchased with silence, putting aside the conflictive history of groups' interrelations and interdependence. In the words of Paula Treichler, "How do we address the issues and concerns raised by women of color, who may themselves be even more excluded from theoretical feminist discourse than from the women's studies curriculum? . . . Can we explore our 'common differences' without (31) overemphasizing the division that currently seems to characterize the feminism of the United States and the world?" (1986, 791). Clearly, this exploration appears impossible without a reconfiguration of the subject of feminist theory, and her relational position to a multiplicity of others, not just white men.

Some recent critics of the "exclusionary practices in Women's Studies" have noted that gender standpoint epistemology leads to a 'tacking on' of "Material about minority women" without any note of its "significance for feminist knowledge" (Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 296). The common approaches noted were the tendency to (1) treat race and class as secondary features in social organization as well as representation! with primacy given to universal female subordination; (2) acknowledge that inequalities of race, class, and gender generate different experiences and then set aside race and class inequalities on the grounds that information was lacking to allow incorporation into an analysis; (3) focus on descriptive aspects of the ways of

life, values, customs, and problems of women in subordinate race and class categories with little attempt to explain their source or their broader meaning (Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 2961). In fact, it may be impossible for gender standpoint epistemology to ever do more than a "pretheoretical presentation of concrete problems" (Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 2971).

Since the subject of feminist theory and its single theme—gender—go largely unquestioned, its point of view tends to suppress and repress voices that question its authority, and as Jane Flax remarks, "The suppression of these voices seems to be a necessary condition for the [apparent) authority coherence, and universality of our own" (1987, 6331). This may account for the inability to include the voices of women of color in feminist discourse, even though they are not necessarily underrepresented in reading lists.

For standpoint epistemologists the desire to construct a feminist theory based solely on gender, on the one hand, and the knowledge or implicit recognition that such an account might distort the representation of many women and/or correspond to that of some men, on the other, gives rise to anxiety and ambivalence with respect to the future of that feminism, especially in Anglo-America. At the core of that attitude is the often unstated recognition that if the pervasiveness of women's oppression is virtually universal on some level, it is also highly diverse from group to group and that women themselves may become complicitous with that oppression. "Complicity arises," says MacDonell, "where through lack of a positive starting point either a practice is driven to make use of prevailing values or a critique becomes the basis for a new theory" (1986, 62).

The inclusion of other analytical categories such as race and class becomes impossible for a subject whose consciousness refuses to acknowledge (32) that "one becomes a woman" in ways that are much more complex than simple opposition to men. In cultures in which asymmetric race and class relations are a central organizing principle of society, one may also "become a woman" in opposition to other women. In other words, the whole category of woman may also need to be problematized, a point that I shall take up below.

Simone de Beauvoir and her key work *The Second Sex* have been most influential in the development of feminist standpoint epistemology. She may even be responsible for the creation of Anglo-American feminist theory's "episteme": a highly self-conscious ruling-class white Western female subject locked in a struggle to the death with "Man." Beauvoir shook the world of women, most especially with the ramifications of her phrase, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman" (1974, 301). For over 400 pages of text after that statement, Beauvoir demonstrates how a female is constituted as a "woman" by society as her freedom is curtailed from childhood. The curtailment of freedom incapacitates her from affirming "herself as a subject" (1974, 316). Very few women, indeed, can escape the cycle of indoctrination except perhaps the writer/intellectual because "She knows that she is a conscious being, a subject" (1974, 761). This particular kind of woman can perhaps make of her gender a project and transform her sexual identity.³

But what of those women who are not so privileged, who neither have the political freedom nor the education? Do they now, then, occupy the place of the Other (the 'Brave') while some women become subjects? Or do we have to make a subject of the whole world?

Regardless of our point of view in this matter, the way to becoming a female subject has been effected through consciousness raising. In 1982, in a major theoretical essay, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory," Catherine A. MacKinnon cited Bridge as a book that explored the relationship between sex and race and argued that "consciousness-raising" was the feminist method (1982, 336-381). The reference to Bridge is brief. It served as an example, along with other texts, of the challenge that race and nationalism have posed for Marxism. According to her, Marxism has been unable to account for the appearance of these emancipatory discourses nor has it been able to assimilate them. Nevertheless MacKinnon's major point was to demonstrate the epistemological challenge that feminism and its primary method, "consciousness-raising," posed for Marxism. Within Marxism class as a method of analysis had failed to reckon with the historical force of sexism. Through "consciousness-raising", (from women's point of view) women are led to know the world in a different way. Women's experience of politics, of life as sex objects, gives (33) rise to its own method of appropriating

that reality: feminist method (MacKinnon 1982, 536~). It challenges the objectivity of the "empirical gaze" and "rejects the distinction between knowing subject and known object" (MacKinnon 1982, 536i). By having women be the subject of knowledge, the so-called "objectivity" of men is brought into question. Often this leads to privileging women's way of knowing in opposition to men's way of knowing, thus sustaining the very binary opposition that feminism would like to change or transform. Admittedly, this is only one of the many paradoxical procedures in feminist thinking as Nancy Cott confirms, "It acknowledges diversity among women while positing that women recognize their unity. It requires gender consciousness for its basis, yet calls for the elimination of prescribed gender roles" (1986, 49~).

However, I suspect that these contradictions or paradoxes have more profound implications than is readily apparent. Part of the problem may be that as feminist practice and theory recuperate their sexual differential through "consciousness-raising," women reinscribe such a differential as feminist epistemology or theory. With gender as the central concept in feminist thinking, epistemology is flattened out in such a way that we lose sight of the complex and multiple ways in which the subject and object of possible experience are constituted. The flattening effect is multiplied when one considers that gender is often solely related to white men. There's no inquiry into the knowing subject beyond the fact of being a "woman." But what is a "woman" or a "man" for that matter? If we refuse to define either term according to some "essence," then we are left with having to specify their conventional significance in time and space, which is liable to change as knowledge increases or interests change.

The fact that Anglo-American feminism has appropriated the generic term for itself, leaves many a woman in this country having to call herself otherwise, that is, "women of color," which is equally "meaningless" without further specification. It also gives rise to the tautology, Chicana women.

Needless to say, the requirement of gender consciousness only in relationship to man leaves us in the dark about a good many things, including interracial and intercultural relations. It may well be that the only purpose this type of differential has is as a political strategy. It does not help us envision a world beyond binary

restrictions, nor does it help us reconfigure feminist theory to include the "native female." It does, however, help us grasp the paradox that within this cultural context one cannot be a feminist without becoming a gendered subject of knowledge which makes it very difficult to transcend gender at all and to imagine relations between women.

In *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (1983), Alison M. Jaggar, (34) speaking as a socialist feminist, refers repeatedly to Bridge and other works by women of color unrepresented in feminist theory. Jaggar claims that socialist feminism is inspired by Marxist and radical feminist politics though the latter has failed to be scientific about its insights. Bridge is cited various times to counter the racist and classist position of radical feminists (1983, 249-50, 295-96~). Jaggar charges that "Radical feminism has encouraged women to name their own experience but it has not recognized explicitly that this experience must be analyzed, explained and theoretically transcended" (38 I 1. In a sense Jaggar's charge amounts to the notion that radical feminists were flattening out their knowledge by an inadequate methodology, that is, gender consciousness-raising.

Many of Jaggar's observations are a restatement of Bridge's challenge to Anglo-American feminists of all political persuasions, be it liberal, radical, Marxist, or socialist, the types sketched out by Jaggar. For example, Jaggar's "A representation of reality from the standpoint of women must draw on the variety of all women's experience" (386) may be compared to Barbara Smith's view in Bridge that "Feminism is the political theory and practice to free all women: women of color, working-class women, poor women, physically challenged women, lesbians, old women, as well as white economically privileged heterosexual women" (61). Jaggar continues, "Since historically diverse groups of women, such as working-class women, women of color, and others have been excluded from intellectual work, they somehow must be enabled to participate as subjects as well as objects of feminist theorizing" (386~). Similarly, writers in Bridge appear to think that "consciousness-raising" and the naming of one's experience would deliver some theory and yield a notion of "what feminist means to us" (xxiii). However, except for Smith's statement, there is no overarching view that would guide us as to "what feminist means to us." Though there is a tacit political identity—

gender/class/race—encapsulated in the phrase "women of color" that connects the pieces, they tend to split apart into "vertical relations" between "culture of resistance" and the "culture resisted or from which excluded." Thus, the binary restrictions become as prevalent between race/ethnicity of oppressed versus oppressor as that between the sexes.

The problems inherent to Anglo-American feminism and race relations are so locked into the "Self-Other" theme that it is no surprise that Bridge's coeditor Moraga would remark, "In the last three years I have learned that Third World feminism does not provide the kind of easy political framework that women of color are running to in droves. The idea of Third World feminism has proved to be much easier between the covers of a book than between real live women" (Moraga, foreword to the second (35) edition!. She refers to the United States, of course, because feminism is alive and well throughout the Third World largely within the purview of women's rights or as a class struggle.⁴

The appropriation of Bridge's observations in Jaggar's work differs slightly from the others in its view of linguistic usage implying to a limited extent that language is also reflective of material existence. The crucial question is how indeed can women of color be subjects as well as objects of feminist theorizing? Jaggar cites Maria Lugones's doubts, "We cannot talk to you in our language because you do not understand it.... The power of white Anglo women vis-a-vis Hispanas and African-American women is in inverse proportion to their working knowledge of each other.... Because of their ignorance, white Anglo women who try to do theory with women of color inevitably disrupt the dialogue. Before they can contribute to collective dialogue, they need to 'know the text,' to have become familiar with an alternative way of viewing the world.... You need to learn to become unintrusive, unimportant, patient to the point of tears, while at the same time open to learning any possible lessons. You will have to come to terms with the sense of alienation, of not belonging, of having your world thoroughly disrupted, having it criticized and scrutinized from the point of view of those who have been harmed by it, having important concepts central to it dismissed, being viewed with mistrust" (1983, 386~. Lugones's advice to Anglo women to listen was post-Bridge. But we should recall that one of Bridge's breaks with prevailing conventions was, of course, linguistic. If

prevailing conventions of speaking/writing had been observed many a contributor would have been censored or silenced. So would have many a major document or writing by minorities. Bridge leads us to understand that the silence and silencing of people begins with the dominating enforcement of linguistic conventions, the resistance to relational dialogues, as well as the disablement of peoples by outlawing their forms of speech.

As already noted, Anglo-American feminist theory has assumed a speaking subject who is an autonomous, self-conscious individual woman; yet, it has also taken for granted the linguistic status which founds subjectivity. In this way it appropriates woman/women for itself and turns its work into a theoretical project within which the rest of us are compelled to fit. By forgetting or refusing to take into account that we are culturally constituted in and through language in complex ways and not just engendered in a homogeneous situation, the Anglo-American subject of consciousness cannot come to terms with her own class-biased ethnocentrism. She is blinded to her own construction not just as woman but as an Anglo-American one. Such a subject creates a theoretical subject that could not possibly include all women just because we are women. (36)

Against this feminist backdrop many "women of color" have struggled to give voice to their subjectivity, as evidenced in the publication of the writings collected in Bridge. However, the freedom of women of color to posit themselves as multiple-voiced subjects is constantly in peril of repression precisely at that point where our constituted contradictions put them at odds with women different from themselves.

The pursuit of a "politics of unity" solely based on gender forecloses the "pursuit of solidarity" through different political formations and the exploration of alternative theories of the subject of consciousness. There is a tendency in more sophisticated and elaborate gender standpoint epistemologists to affirm "an identity made up of heterogeneous and heteronomous representations of gender, race, and class, and often indeed across languages and cultures" (De Lauretis 1986, 9) with one breath and with the next to refuse to explore how that identity may be theorized or analyzed, by reconfirming a unified subjectivity or "shared consciousness" through gender. The difference is handed over with one hand and taken away with the other.

If it were true as Teresa de Lauretis has observed that "Self and identity, . . . are always grasped and understood within particular discursive configurations" (1986, 8), it does not necessarily follow that one can easily and self-consciously decide "to reclaim (an identity) from a history of multiple assimilations" (1986, 9) and still retain a "shared consciousness." Such a practice goes counter to the homogenizing tendency of the subject of consciousness in the United States. To be oppressed means to be disabled not only from grasping an "identity," but also from reclaiming it.

To grasp or reclaim an identity in this culture means always already to have become a subject of consciousness. The theory of the subject of consciousness as a unitary and synthesizing agent of knowledge is always already a posture of domination. One only has to think of Gloria Anzaldúa's essay in *Bridge*, "Speaking in Tongues: A Letter to Third World Women Writers" (165-74~. Though De Lauretis concedes that a racial "shared consciousness," may have prior claims than gender, she still insists on unity through gender, "the female subject is always constructed and defined in gender, starting from gender" (1986, 19). One is interested in having more than an account of gender; there are other relations to be accounted for. De Lauretis still insists, in most of her work, that "the differences among women may be better understood as differences within women" (1986, 14~. This position returns us all to our solitary, though different, consciousness, without noting that some differences are (have been) a result of relations of domination of women by women, that differences may be purposefully constituted for the purpose of domination or exclusion, especially in oppositional thinking. (37)

Some of the writers in *Bridge* thought at some point in the seventies that feminism could have been the ideal answer to their hope for liberation. Chrystos, for example, states her disillusionment as follows, "I no longer believe that feminism is a tool which can eliminate racism or even promote better understanding between different races & kinds of women" (169~. The disillusionment is eloquently reformulated in the theme poem by Donna Kate Rushin, "The Bridge Poem" (xxi-xxii~. The dream of helping the people who surround her to reach an interconnectedness that would change society is given up in favor of self-translation into a "true self." In my view the speaker's refusal to play "bridge," an enablement to others as well as self, is the acceptance of defeat at the hands of political groups whose selfdefinition follows the

view of self as unitary capable of being defined by a single "theme." The speaker's perception that the "self" is multiple ("I'm sick of mediating with your worst self / On behalf of your better selves" [xxii]) and its reduction harmful gives emphasis to the relationality between one's selves and those of others as an ongoing process of struggle, effort, and tension. Indeed, in this poem the better "Bridging self" of the speaker is defeated by the overriding notion of the unitary subject of knowledge and consciousness so prevalent in Anglo-American culture.

Difference, whether it be sexual, racial, or social, has to be conceptualized within a political and an ideological domain.⁵ In *Bridge*, for example, Mirtha Quintanales points out that "in this country, in this world, racism is used both to create false differences among us and to mask very significant ones—cultural, economic, political" (1531).

Consciousness as a site of multiple voicings is the theoretical subject, par excellence, of *Bridge*. These voicings (or thematic threads) are not viewed as necessarily originating with the subject, but as discourses that transverse consciousness and which the subject must struggle with constantly. Rosario Morales, for example, says "I want to be whole. I want to claim myself to be Puerto Rican, and U.S. American, working class & middle class, housewife and intellectual, feminist, marxist and antiimperialist" ("I. Gloria Anzaldua observes, "What am I? A third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic leanings. They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label" (:os). The need to assign multiple registers of existence is an effect of the belief that knowledge of one's subjectivity cannot be arrived at through a single "theme." Indeed the multiple-voiced subjectivity is lived in resistance to competing notions for one's allegiance or self-identification. It is a process of disidentification (Pecheux 1982, 158-59) with prevalent formulations of the most forcefully theoretical subject of feminism.

The choice of one or many themes is both a theoretical and a political (38) decision. Like gender epistemologists and other emancipatory movements, the theoretical subject of *Bridge* gives credit to the subject of consciousness as the site of knowledge but problematizes it by representing it as a weave. In Anzaldua's terms the woman of color has a "plural personality." Speaking of the new mestiza in

Borderlands/La Frontera, she says, "She learns to juggle cultures. The juncture where the mestiza stands, is where phenomena tend to collide" (1987, 791). As an object of multiple indoctrinations that heretofore have collided upon her, their new recognition as products of the oppositional thinking of others can help her come to terms with the politics of varied discourses and their antagonistic relations.

The most remarkable tendency in the work reviewed in this essay is the implicit or explicit acknowledgment that, on the one hand, women of color are excluded from feminist theorizing on the subject of consciousness and, on the other, that though excluded from theory, their books are read in the classroom and/or duly (footnoted). Given these current institutional and political practices in the United States, it is almost impossible to go beyond an oppositional theory of the subject. However, it is not the theory that will help us grasp the subjectivity of women of color. Socially and historically, women of color have been now central, now outside antagonist relations among races, classes, and genders. It is this struggle of multiple antagonisms, almost always in relation to culturally different groups, and not just genders, that gives configuration to the theoretical subject of Bridge. It must be noted, however, that each woman of color cited here, even in her positing of a "plurality of self," is already privileged enough to reach the moment of cognition of a situation for herself. This should suggest that to privilege the subject, even if multiple-voiced, is not enough.

Notes

1. Hereinafter cited as *Bridge*. The book has had two editions. I use the second edition published by Kitchen Table Press, ^ ~' Press, 1981.

2. The first edition was published by Persephone

3. For an intriguing demonstration of these operations, see Seyla Benhabib "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory" (1987, 77-95).

4. For a detailed discussion of this theme, see Judith Butler, "Variations on Sex and

ender: Beauvoir, Wittig, and Foucault" 1987, 28-421.

4. See Miranda Davies 1987.

s. Monique Wittig cited in Elizabeth Meese 1986, 74. (39)