THE USE OF XAPA IN THE NEW TESTAMENT AND ITS BACKGROUND IN HELLENISTIC MORAL PHILOSOPHY*

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SUMMARY
This study investigates the uses of χαρά in the NT against the backdrop of ancient theories of emotions, especially those developed in Hellenistic moral philosophy. This offers an assessment of a noteworthy example of the influence of Stoic ethics on the NT, within the treatment of πάθη, προπάθειαι, and εὐπάθειαι therein.

KEYWORDS
New Testament, Hellenistic moral philosophy, ancient theories of emotions

SUMMARY
Questo saggio analizza gli usi di χαρά nel NT alla luce delle teorie antiche sulle affezioni, specialmente quelle delle dottrine etiche ellenistiche. Ciò offre una valutazione critica di un esempio notevole di influsso dell’etica stoica sul NT, entro la presentazione neotestamentaria di πάθη, προπάθειαι ed εὐπάθειαι.

PAROLE CHIAVE
Nuovo Testamento, etiche filosofiche ellenistiche, teorie antiche delle affezioni

Fecha de recepción: 28/06/2010
Fecha de aceptación y versión final: 23/07/2010

WHAT IS XAPA?

The ancient Greek vocabulary is rich in terms for happiness, pleasure, and joy, and the distinctions among them, while sometimes subtle, are significant for our understanding of classical and Christian texts. In this paper, we focus on the evolution of one of those terms in classical Greek, namely χαρά, which we translate as “joy,” tracing it from its early uses to its occurrences in the New Testament, with a particular focus on the Gospels, but with attention also to the rest of the NT.

*This work is part and preparation of a larger, long-term project on πάθη, προπάθειαι, and εὐπάθειαι in the Gospels and the rest of the New Testament against the backdrop of Hellenistic moral philosophy.

BIBLID [1699-3225 (2010) 14, 185-204]
What kind of a sentiment is χαρά? Is it a sensation, an emotion, a mental state or disposition -- or does it perhaps pertain to some other psychological category or function? How, in turn, does it relate to neighboring concepts such as happiness (eudamonia), pleasure (hêdonê), delight (terpsis), and the like? To understand the nature of χαρά, it is necessary to investigate how the term was understood by the Greeks themselves.

The word is largely poetic: it is not found in Herodotus or Thucydides, for example, though it does turn up in Xenophon’s Hellenica, where it is opposed to lupê or grief (7.1.37; cf. 7.2.9, Cyr. 7.5.32, each time contrasted with weeping); significantly, in his treatise on hunting (6.15) Xenophon attributes χαρά to dogs, and it is also among the names assigned to these animals (7.5). Nor is the term frequent among the orators: thus, it is absent in Antiphon, Andocide, Lyssias, Isocrates, and Isaeus, and occurs once only in Demosthenes (Cor. 217); once too in the Corpus Hippocraticum (Par. 14), where it is contrasted with an excess of fear. The word appears first in lyric poetry (it is not found in Homer or Hesiod, or in Pindar). Sappho (fr. 5 Page) speaks of χαρά for our friends, as opposed to our enemies: this is apparently a reminiscence of the ideal expressed by Odysseus at Hom. Od. 6.184–85, of giving pain to those who wish us ill and joy (kharmata) to those who are kindly disposed to us. Archilochus (fr. 328 West), in turn, seems to equate terpsis, khara, and hêdonê, as the pleasure we take in the consciousness that we have done nothing shameful (for the collocation of these three terms, cf. Pl. Phl. 19C). Xαρά occurs a few times in Aeschylean tragedy, and nine times in Sophocles’ surviving plays, where again it is contrasted with weeping (El. 312–13; cf. Aesch. Ag. 270, 541, E. IT 832) and with pain (pêma, Tr. 129; cf. E. Tr. 542); it may express the reaction to a good but unexpected turn of events (Antigone 392). Euripides is more sparing: nine or ten times in the surviving plays and fragments. But χαρά occurs only once in Aristophanes (Pl. 637, spoken by the chorus), and nowhere in the authentic fragments of Menander.

ARISTOTLE

The most extensive and detailed treatment of the emotions to come down to us from classical antiquity is Aristotle’s discussion of several pathè in the second book of the Rhetoric, where he analyzes anger, calming down, love, hatred, fear, shame, pity, envy, and gratitude, among others. χαρά is conspicuously absent from this list, especially given the fact that Aristotle does include χαρά among the pathè at NÉ 1105b21-23 (this is the only occurrence of the word in the entire treatise), and also at an. 403a16-18. Why, then, did he omit a more elaborated discussion of it in the Rhetoric? Perhaps Aristotle did not intend to provide an exhaustive survey of the pathè here, but simply a sampling of the most common ones. Given that χαρά is, as we have seen, largely poetic in register and all but absent in historical and
rhetorical prose, Aristotle may have thought that it was less relevant than the other passions to practitioners of forensic and deliberative oratory, to whom his treatise was, after all, addressed. However, another, and perhaps deeper, reason for the omission of χαρά from the treatment of pathê in the Rhetoric also suggests itself. For Aristotle may have felt that χαρά did not quite qualify as a pathos in the rich sense in which he understood the term at the time when he was composing the Rhetoric and subjecting the concept to a particularly careful analysis.

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle offers the following rather opaque definition of pathos: “Let the pathê be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain [lupê] and pleasure [hêdonê], for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites” (2.1, 1378a20-23). If the pathê are defined by their effect on judgments or kriseis, then there is prima facie reason to suppose that they are not the kinds of things that non-rational animals will experience, since they do not typically possess reason or form critical judgments. What is more, according to this definition, pain and pleasure do not themselves count as pathê, in contrast to sentiments such as anger, pity, and fear. Pleasure and pain fall rather under the category of aisthêseis or sensations. If Aristotle considered χαρά to be something akin to pleasure, at least in many of its uses, and thus based in perception and not entailing belief or judgment, then he would have had good reason not to include it in the cognitively oriented discussion of the pathê in the Rhetoric. Now, in gen. an. 723b32-724a3, sex is said to produce pleasure (hêdonê) in animals, but if it occurs frequently the joy (kharein) is diminished; what is more, χαρά should be experienced in all parts of the body (cf. 727b35). In the Topics (112b22-23), Aristotle reports that Prodicus distinguished the hêdonai into the three subcategories of χαρά, terpsis and euphrosunê (the pseudo-Platonic Definitions 413E2 states that euphrosunê is χαρά at the actions of moderate person, and we have seen that Plato himself associates χαρά with hêdonê and terpsis (Phl. 19C7). To the extent that χαρά is comparable to hêdonê, and is, like pleasure, experienced by animals that lack reason or logos, it would fail to qualify as a pathos or emotion in the full and richly cognitive sense of the term with Aristotle endows it in the Rhetoric.\footnote{On Aristotle’s view of the cognitive character of emotions, see D. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, Toronto-Buffalo-London, 2006. Review by I. Ramelli in RFN 99.3, 2007, 558-63.}

Aristotle defines happiness, or eudaimonia, in turn, as “an activity [energeia] of the soul in accord with complete virtue” (NE 1102a5-6); it is the goal to which all others are subordinate or intermediate. Clearly, χαρά is not to be equated with such a state.
**Epicureanism**

In a terminological move that seems almost to have been deliberately intended to challenge or reverse Aristotle’s categories, Epicurus described pleasure and pain precisely as *pathê*. Thus, *pathos* appears as one of three (or perhaps four) basic epistemological capacities that Epicurus called “criteria”: thus, according to Diogenes Laertius, the Epicureans “say that there are two *pathê*, pleasure [*hédône*] and pain [*algêdôn*], which exist in every animal, the one pertaining to what is one’s own [*oikeion*], the other pertaining to what is foreign [*allotron*], by which choices and avoidances are distinguished” (10.34). Diogenes notes, moreover, that “in the *Canon*, Epicurus says that the criteria of truth are sensations [*aisthêseis*] and preconceptions [*prolepseis*] and the *pathê*, and some Epicureans add the imaginative projections of thought [*tas phantastikas epibolas tês dianoias*]” (10.31). Epicurus also associates sensations and *pathê* in several passages in the *Letter to Herodotus* (37-38, 55, 63, 82; cf. Epicurus’ *Principal Doctrines* 24). For example, he affirms: “For it is necessary to look to the primary concept behind each sound.... Then we must observe everything in accord with the *aisthêseis*, and, simply, the attendant projections whether of thought or of some other of the criteria, and so too the occurring *pathê*” (38; cf. Epicurus’ *Letter to Pythocles* 116). The *pathê*, then, function alongside *aisthêseis* and certain processes of thought, and together provide us with all the information we have concerning the world. This is consistent with Epicurus’ argument that pleasure (*hédône*) may be shown to be the goal (*telos*) inasmuch as “animals as soon as they are born are satisfied with it but are in conflict with suffering [*ponos*] by nature and apart from reason [*logos*]. So it is by our experience all on its own [*autopathôs*] that we avoid pain [*algêdôn*]” (trans. Inwood and Gerson). The *pathê* of pleasure and pain function automatically, and do not depend on reason.

If pleasure and pain are classified as *pathê*, what is the status of χαρά in Epicurean theory? A scholium incorporated into the text of Diogenes Laertius 10.66 (fr. 311 Usener) reports: “He [i.e., Epicurus] says elsewhere that it [the soul] is made up of very smooth and round atoms, which differ greatly from those of fire; and one part of it is non-rational [*alogon*], and dispersed throughout the rest of the body; but the rational part [*to logikon*] is in the chest [*thôrax*], as is evident from fears [*phoboi*] and from joy [*χαρά*].” If the *pathê* are experienced by the *psukhê* (or what Lucretius calls the *anima*), and are not located in the rational portion of the mind, the twin emotions of fear and joy, on the contrary, belong specifically to the *logikon* part of the soul, and are distinct from the *pathê*.

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What, then, is the status of χαρά in Epicurus' system? It is evidently a sentiment that involves reasoning or judgment, and hence can be said to be false or empty, to the extent that the beliefs that motivate it are untrue. In this, it is analogous to fear, with an oppositive valence, as it were: fears too involve logos, and just for that reason can be empty (e.g., the fear of death, for Epicureans). Both these sentiments -- which on an Aristotelian analysis would qualify as pathê and which we may, without too much distortion, render as “emotions” -- are distinct from what the Epicureans identify as criteria, and which are automatic and infallible: sensations, the pathê (in Epicurean terminology) of pleasure and pain, and the prolêpseis or preconceptions. We may note in passing that χαρά should not be confused with the goal or telos, which is variously described in Epicurean texts either as hêdonê (cf. Diogenes Laertius 10.11, 131, 137) or as ataraxia, “freedom from perturbation” (cf. Epicurus' Letter to Pythocles 85; Diogenes Laertius 10.128, where ataraxy is defined similarly to hêdonê as “neither suffering pain [al-gein] nor anxious fear [tarein],”) but never as χαρά.

χαρά, then, is a rational emotion which responds to an impression of something deemed to be pleasant. As such, it, like fear, is corrigible, and hence able to be mistaken. One may, for example, imagine oneself acquiring a large fortune, and think oneself perfectly secure as a result. If one is thinking of security against death, this will be a false kind of joy, dependent on what Epicurus calls empty belief or kenodoxia and motivated in large part by a fear that is itself irrational. An Epicurean sage, one supposes, will experience χαρά, but it will be based on true beliefs or judgments, and hence will be reliable; but it is not the ultimate pleasure that defines the nature of Epicurean eudaimonia.

STOICISM
The Stoics, in turn, seem to have adopted a part of the Epicurean approach to χαρά, insofar as they took it to involve belief, but gave the term a more strictly positive interpretation. Indeed, according to Galen (Hipp. et Plat. plac. 3.7, p. 302 M.), Chrysippus too argued that the mind was located in the chest by citing the emotions of χαρά and tharsos, or confidence (although he also placed the sensations of pain and pleasure there as well; for confidence associated with the generally positive emotions of χαρά and euphrosunê and boulêsis -- which are said not to be virtues -- cf. Stob. ecl. II p. 58, 5 W.).

But χαρά was deemed by the Stoics to constitute one of the three eu-patheiai, that is, good emotions (SVF 3.431 = Diogenes Laertius 7.116\(^3\)), which are those experienced by sages, and only by them, as opposed to or-

\(^3\) See I. Ramelli’s notes to this paragraph in Diogene Laerzio, Vite e dottrine dei più celebri filosofi, in collaboration with G. Reale and G. Girgenti, Milan 2005.
ordinary emotions or pathê, which are excessive in nature (irrational in this sense) and are experienced by those who fall short of wisdom. Chrysippus in his Peri pathôn described eupatheiai as eulogoi hormai, or rational impulses, whereas pathê are alogoi or irrational hormai (SVF 3.389).4

Among the impulses experienced by human beings, some are practical, in that they concern a future object and involve an action that is still to be accomplished, while others are non-practical and concern a present object. Practical impulses of the irrational kind constitute the pathê of epithumia and phobos, that is, desire and fear: the former derives from an inclination toward something (orexis), whereas the latter derives from a repulsion (ekklisis). The corresponding rational impulses or eupatheiai are, respectively, boulêsis and eulabeia, or will and circumspection. Non-practical impulses of the irrational kind (pathê) are hèdonê and lupê, the former again the consequence of an inclination toward something (orexis), the latter of a repulsion or movement away (ekklisis). There is only one corresponding rational impulse or eupatheia, and this is precisely χαρά, which is the rational counterpart of hèdonê. Lupê, however, has no rational counterpart. Thus, the eupatheiai fall under just three heads, rather than four, as in the case of the pathê (cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.115-16; SVF 3.391 = Ps. Andronicus Peri pathôn 1).

Under the four broad headings that cover the generic pathê, as it were, the Stoics discriminated a great number of subtypes, and equally in the case of the three classes of eupatheiai. Thus Ps.-Andronicus (Peri pathôn 6 = SVF 3.432) distinguished three kinds of χαρά: terpsis (delight), which is a joy that brings about advantages; euphrosunê (beatitude), which is the joy that comes from the deeds of the wise and equilibrate person (echoing the pseudo-Platonic Definitions, cited above); and euthumia (serenity), which is the joy that derives from a kind of life or the absence of any desire (this list is echoed in Alexander of Aphrodisias = SVF 3.434; cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.94).

As an emotion, as distinct from an instinctive “pre-emotion” or propatheia,5 χαρά depends on the sage’s true belief, which is deemed by the Stoics to be kataleptikos or infallible: it is a correct and immediate apprehension. In this, the sage differs from ordinary human beings, whose beliefs are subject to error. If the Epicureans, then, in contrast to Aristotle, elevated χαρά decisively to the status of an emotion, involving cognition and located in the rational part of the soul, and hence not a sentiment shared by animals, the Stoics took yet

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5 On propatheiai see Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, 85-100, who rightly distinguishes feelings and affective responses to them, as a result of judgment (i.e., emotions proper).
a further step, and made of it a strictly rational sentiment, not only in the
sense that it involved belief (rational in the sense that all adult human beings
have a capacity for reason), but also in that the belief was necessarily true and
depended on cataleptic apprehension (rational in the larger sense of being
grounded in a correct understanding of the world as such). It is against the
backdrop of the Epicurean and Stoic conceptions of χαρά that the use of
the term in Christian texts becomes clear, both in its application to ordinary
human beings (as in Epicureanism), who have genuine χαρά when their beliefs
are correct and stable, but false χαρά (analogous to false phobos) when their
beliefs are either false or poorly grounded, and in its association with divine
joy, which looks back to the Stoic conception.

**The New Testament: The Influence of Stoicism and the LXX and the
Need for an Investigation**

There is especially a Stoic background to the use of χαρά in the Gospels, as
the subsequent analysis will make it clear. For in Stoicism, χαρά has become
dignified as a sentiment that is specific to the sage, and is never based on wrong
belief: this is part of the Stoics’ idea of kataleptic impressions or phantasiai;
χαρά is thus a general name for a set of subordinate positive feelings that are all
strictly rational. And in the New Testament, χαρά seems to be used principally
in connection with the kind of joy that derives from God and belief in Christ
as his son. It is a transcendental joy, as opposed to mere pleasure or ἡδονή
—a word that occurs only five times in the New Testament, and just once in
the Gospels (Luke). Probably, common language too had begun to assimilate
the idea of χαρά as a higher type of joy. See, for instance, Polybius 1.36.1 for
an interesting example of a υπερβολὴ χαράς, associated with worship (also
at 18.46.11; and cf. 11.33.7); but it would be possible to report examples from
Dionysius of Halicarnassus or Diodorus Siculus as well.

The influence of the LXX on the NT use of χαρά must also be taken
into account, but in turn the use in the LXX emerges in the most Hellenized
books, mainly in Esther (8:17; 9:17-18; 9:22; 10:3; ), Esdras (4:63; 5:53; 5:61),
Tobias (11:18; 13:11 and, from Cod. Sinaiticus, 7:17; 11:17-18; 13:11; 13:16), Mac-
cabees (1= 4:59; 5:54; 2= 3:30; 4:10; 15:28), Wisdom (8:16). Psalms (20:7; 125:2)
and Proverbs (14:13; 29:6), Ecclesiasticus (1:12; 30:16), Jonas (4:6), and a few
other places in later prophets; no occurrences are found in the Pentateuch,
or even in the so-called historical books such as Samuel, Kings, or Chronicles
(apart from 1Chron 29:22). This is a later term in the OT, and marked by the
influence of Hellenism.

Only extremely few scholarly books in English have been devoted to
emotions in the Gospels, and none of them treats them on the background

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*From Isaiah, only the most recent parts: 39:2; 55:12 (twice); 66:10; Jer 15:16; 16:9; 25:10; Lam 5:15; Bar 4:22; Zach 8:19; Joel 1:5, 12, 16.*
of the Hellenistic moral philosophy; the very choice of what to consider an “emotion” is not conducted on the basis of the Hellenistic classification of πάθη, προπάθειαι, and εὐπάθειαι. One of these books, a revised edition of a doctoral dissertation, briefly treats χαρά, but it refers only to Jesus’ own emotions, and moreover is restricted to only one Gospel, that of John; also, its concern is theological: it aims at establishing whether, and how, Jesus’ emotions refer to his humanity or his divinity, in the context of the contrast between Bultmann’s, Käsemann’s, and Schnackenburg’s lines. Χαρά is notably absent from the careful book by Giuseppe Barbaglio, which studies emotions, not in all of the Gospels or all of the NT, but specifically in Jesus, and sometimes in Paul, some “feelings” that he calls “emozioni,” but are not the ancient emotions as theorized by Aristotle, the Epicureans, or the Stoics, and which are taken as a reference both in the present study and in the broader project. Moreover, his concern is theological (was Jesus liable to passions?) and ecclesiological (conflict in the early Church, etc).

The Gospels

The distribution of the occurrences of χαρά is uneven in the Gospels and meaningful per se. Mark has only one occurrence of χαρά; Matthew and Luke have many (six in Matthew, eight in Luke), and often parallel occurrences; John presents the highest concentration of occurrences of this noun in all Gospels. He develops a proper notion of χαρά and insists on it in a special way, as a specific theological theme. It was also necessary to examine all the occurrences of χαίρω in the Gospels, which reflect those of χαρά.

Mark

Mark has χαρά only in one parable, parallel to Matthew, in 4:16, in which he speaks of those who receive Jesus’ word immediately and with joy (εὐθὺς μετὰ χαρᾶς), but are not steadfast. The very wording is identical to that which is found in Matthew 13:20.

7 S. Voorwinde, Jesus’ Emotions in the Fourth Gospel: Human or Divine?, London 2005, Library of New Testament Studies 284. Particularly helpful for a systematic study of πάθη, προπάθειαι, and εὐπάθειαι in the NT is the appendix on the terminology for emotions in the Old Testament, the Dead Sea scrolls, the Apocrypha, each of the Gospels, and the rest of the New Testament, even though no attention is paid to the classification of πάθη, προπάθειαι, and εὐπάθειαι in Hellenistic moral philosophy.

8 Emozioni e sentimenti di Gesù, Bologna 2009.

9 These are the “feelings” that are taken into consideration by Barbaglio: meekness, paternity/filiality, peace, empathy with illness and suffering, waiting, fear, walking, sleep, parrhēsia, pride, ἀγάπη, conflict and reconciliation in the first Christian communities.

10 See also James Breig, The Emotional Jesus, Mystic, CT 1996, which however has only theological concerns and is not scholarly proper, and a rich article, again focusing only on Jesus’ emotions: B.B. Warfield, “The Emotional Life of Our Lord”, in S.G. Craig (ed.), The Person and Work of Christ, Philadelphia 1950, 93-145.
Matthew

In Matthew χαρά is found in the infancy narrative, in the account of the resurrection, and in three parables. In the infancy narrative, in 2:10, the theme of joy is exceptionally emphasized by means of an etymological figure, the adjective “great” in reference to “joy,” and the adverb “strongly”.

The mages, when they saw the star that indicated the location of baby Jesus, whom they were looking for, ἐχάρησαν χαρὰν μεγάλην σφόδρα, “strongly rejoiced of a great joy,” or “rejoiced of an extremely strong joy.” The birth of Jesus is the cause of immense joy even for people coming from very far.

Like his birth, so is also his rebirth, i.e., his resurrection from the dead, the reason for a “great joy.” In 28:8, the women, after seeing the empty tomb and knowing that Jesus has risen, go announce all this to the other disciples “with fear and great joy” (μετὰ φόβου καὶ χαρᾶς μεγάλης). Immediately after, Jesus himself meets them and addresses them with an ambiguous formula: Χαίρετε (28:9). Does this mean only “Hi!” or does it also mean: “Rejoice!”? I think that the latter is the case, all the more in that in 28:10 the only other address formula of Jesus to the women is Μὴ φοβεῖσθε. Rejoice and do not fear: a perfect parallel to the couple φόβος and χαρά that describes the women’s reaction to the resurrection of Jesus. It is to be noticed that this couple is uneven from the axiological point of view: while φόβος is a pathos, χαρά is an eupatheia. The eupatheia that corresponds to φόβος is εὐλάβεια. But here the evangelist chose φόβος, and this unevenness in the couple of emotions is surely intentional: φόβος is meant to be negative, and χαρά, on the contrary, positive, since Jesus’ reaction is Μὴ φοβεῖσθε, “Do not fear,” but not, “Do not rejoice.” Only φόβος is corrected by Jesus, not χαρά for the resurrection of Jesus, which is entirely positive. Indeed, in 28:9 Jesus exhorts the women: Χαίρετε.

Three parables also include joy, one – which has a parallel in the Mark passage mentioned above – in 13:20, in which Jesus speaks of those who receive Jesus’ word, represented as a seed, immediately and with joy (ἐὐθὺς μετὰ χαρᾶς), but are not steadfast, like a rocky soil in which the seed cannot develop its roots and, as soon as a tribulation or persecution comes, they abandon it. The idea here conveyed is that of an enthusiasm that easily comes but is easily lost. In 13:44, in one of the parables of the Kingdom, the latter is assimilated to a treasure that a man finds, and, out of joy (ἀπὸ τῆς χαρᾶς αὐτοῦ), sells everything he possesses to buy that field. The joy is here due to the awareness of having a treasure. In perfect line with the cognitive content of the emotion, the joy of finding a treasure depends on knowing its value: it is not simply pleasure (ἡδονή), irrespective of content. In the third parable, joy is mentioned twice, as a reward to a good and faithful servant who is thus allowed to participate in “the joy of your lord” (εἴσελθε εἰς τὴν χαρὰν τοῦ κυρίου σου, twice, in 25:21 and 23).
Also, in an important parallel with Luke, in 18:13, in the parable of the lost sheep, Jesus says that the shepherd who recovers the lost sheep rejoices more on it (χαίρει ἐπ’ αὐτῷ) that on the other ninety-nine that were not lost. And in 5:12, in the discourse of beatitudes, Jesus exhorts those who are persecuted, oppressed, and calumniated because of him to rejoice and exult (χαίρετε καὶ ἄγαλλιάσθε) because they have a reward in heaven.

In these parables, joy comes from the word of Jesus and the Kingdom of God; it is “the joy of the Lord,” in which all are called to participating. The positivity of this eupatheia is total.

Luke has two occurrences of χαρά in the infancy narrative, others in parables and miracles, and others for the joy of God and angels on the conversion of a sinner, and for the joy of the disciples after being visited by the risen Jesus.

Let us begin from the joy occasioned by the birth and the resurrection of Jesus, at the beginning and the ending of the Gospel. The joy for the birth of Jesus is preceded, and paralleled, by that for the birth of John the Baptist in 1:14, in which Zacharias, his father, is announced by the angel that he will have “joy and exultancy, and many will rejoice for his birth,” ἔσται χαρά σοι καὶ ἄγαλλιάσης, καὶ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει αὐτοῦ χαρῆσονται. The expression is the same as in Matth 5:12 in verbal form (χαίρετε καὶ ἄγαλλιάσθε). The reason for this joy on the birth of John is that “he will have many children of Israel return to the Lord their God” (πολλοὺς τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραήλ ἐπιστρέψει ἐπί κύριον τὸν θεόν αὐτῶν). The theme of joy in relation to the birth of John the Baptist is repeated in 1:58: after the birth of the baby, all the acquaintances and the relatives of Elisabeth rejoiced with her (συνέχαιρον αὐτῇ).

Another angel announces the birth of Jesus to some shepherds in 2:10 as a “great joy” for the whole people of Israel, due to the birth of their savior: εὐαγγελίζομαι χαρὰν μεγάλην ἥτις ἔσται παντὶ τῷ λαῷ, ὅτι ἐτέχθη υἱὸν σήμερον σωτῆρ σώτηρ ὅς ἐστιν Χριστὸς κύριος ἐν πόλει Δαυίδ. The apparition of the risen Jesus to the disciples in 24:41 similarly produces joy, but mingled with wonder and incredulity (ἔτι δὲ ἀπιστούντων αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χαρᾶς καὶ θαυμαζόντων), and in 24:52 the disciples after the ascension of Jesus went to Jerusalem “with great joy,” μετὰ χαρᾶς μεγάλης. Just as in the case of the announcement to Zacharias and to the shepherds, so too in the case of the angel’s announcement to Mary the theme of joy is prominent and the initial Χαίρε – Like Jesus’ Χαίρετε to the women his disciples at his resurrection – seems to convey a stronger meaning than simply “Greetings / Ηi” (whereas the weak sense is surely conveyed in Mark 15:18, Matth 26:49, 27:29, and John 19:3, which of course we shall not take into consideration here). Indeed, the angel immediately explains the reason why Mary should rejoice: for she
has received grace and the Lord is with her (Χαίρε, κεχαριτωμένη, ὁ κύριος μετὰ σου).

Also, joy is expressed by the disciples in 19:37 at Jesus’ entrance in Jerusalem. This joy is again immediately related to God as is expressed by their praising God: χαίροντες αἰνεῖν τὸν θεόν. Joy moreover appears in the same parable of the seed that also appears in Matthew and Mark: in 8:13 it describes the enthusiasm with which some receive the word of Jesus (μετὰ χαρᾶς), but they are not steadfast and this cannot develop roots in them.

Joy is also related in Luke, unlike the other Synoptics, to accounts of miracles. In 10:17 the Seventy-two apostles sent off by Jesus report to him “with joy” (μετὰ χαρᾶς) that demons submit to them. Joy is here due to the submission of the powers of evil to God. Soon after, in 10:20 Jesus confirms that he has given his disciples the force of contrasting the powers of the enemy (the devil), but recommends that they rather rejoice in their being inscribed in heavens (πλὴν ἐν τούτῳ μὴ χαίρετε ὅτι τὰ πνεύματα ὑμῶν ὑποτάσσεται, χαίρετε δὲ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα ὑμῶν ἐγγέγραπται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς). In 13:7 joy is the reaction of the crowds to Jesus’ miracles because they are “glorious” (πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος ἔχαιρεν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐνδόξοις τοῖς γινομένοις ύπ’ αὐτοῦ), obviously in that they display God’s power.

Luke also speaks of the joy that the angels of God experience at the conversion of a sinner to God. He repeats this notion twice, in connection with two parallel parables: in 15:5.6, in the parable of the lost sheep, in which the shepherd rejoices when he finds it (χαίρων) and invites the others to rejoice with him (Συγχάρητε μοι, ὅτι εὗρον τὸ πρόβατόν μου τὸ ὄπλωλός) and 15:10, in the parallel parable of the lost drachma (Συγχάρητε μοι, ὅτι εὗρον τὴν δραχμὴν ἣν ἀπώλεσα), and in Jesus’ comments on the former and the latter, which are parallel in turn: οὕτως χαρὰ ἐν τῷ ὄρατω ἔσται ἐπὶ ἐνὶ ἀμαρτωλῷ μετανοοῦντι ἢ ἐπὶ ἐνενήκοντα ἐν ἑνῶ δικαιος (15:7), οὕτως, λέγω νῦν, μετανοοῦντι τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπὶ ἐνὶ ἀμαρτωλῶ μετανοοῦντι (15:10). Thus, in Luke, the motif of joy found in Matth 18:13 in the parable of the lost sheep is multiplied, over two parallel parables (the lost sheep and the lost drachma), each with three or two remarks on joy: that of the person who recovers the sheep or the drachma, and again that of Jesus who explains that this joy is analogous to that of angels and God in heaven for the conversion of a sinner. It is especially interesting that angels are said to feel χαρά. This is perfectly attuned to the absolute positivity of χαρά and its characterization as a eupatheia, given that eupatheiai in Stoicism were considered to be proper of the wise only, a paradigmatic figure who was assumed to commit no errors of judgment. This impeccably fits the character of angels, who will not be mistaken, and so there is no question of false belief. Especially in John, one step further is taken, as we shall see, and joy is ascribed to Jesus as the eternal Logos of God and as the divinity itself; the disciples’ joy will thus be configured as a participation in this divine joy.
The joy of a sinner received by Jesus and called to host him is underlined in 19:6 (σπεύσας κατέβη, καὶ ὑπεδέξατο αὐτὸν χαίρων) in the episode of Zacchaeus, he is criticized by many as “sinner,” but shows that he has converted in that is ready to give a half of his wealth to the poor and to render four times as much if he has subtracted anything to anyone.

John

John has a true theology of χαρά and the highest concentration of occurrences of this noun in all Gospels: nine in all, plus three occurrences of χαίρω in the strong meaning. And it is remarkable that almost all of these occurrences are gathered in the farewell discourse of Jesus in John 15-17, the great discourse on unity and ὀγθίς.

In this fundamental speech, Jesus explains that he is making this speech remaining or that they remain to his disciples so that his joy is in them (just as his love: he recommends remaining his love) and their joy is “full,” “perfected” (ινα ἡ χαρά ἐμί ἐν ὑμῖν ἔκκολληθήσεται, 15:11). In 16:20 he opposes the joy of the world to that of his disciples: when the world will rejoice, his disciples will cry and grieve: the joy of the world corresponds to λύπη for his disciples, but this λύπη of theirs will turn into joy (κλαύσετε καὶ θρηνήσετε ὑμεῖς, ὁ δὲ κόσμος χαρήσεται ὑμῖν, 15:11). It must be noticed that this reference to the “joy of the world” represents one of the extremely few cases in which χαρά is seen in a negative light in the whole of the New Testament. We shall discuss in a moment the specific opposition between λύπη and χαρά.

Jesus adduces a simile: just as the disciples suffer at the death of Jesus, but will rejoice at his resurrection, in the same way a mother suffers in giving birth, but this affliction is forgotten because of the joy (ἡ γυνὴ ὅταν τίκτῃ λύπην ἔχει ... οὐκέτι μνημονεύει τῆς διὰ τὴν χαράν, 15:21). The dialectic between λύπη and χαρά is repeated immediately after, in 15:22-23: now the disciples have λύπη, but as soon as Jesus, once risen, will visit them again, they will rejoice of a joy that nobody will steal from them: νῦν μὲν λύπην ἔχετε, πάλιν δὲ όψεσθε χαράν, καὶ ἡ λύπην υμῶν οὐδεὶς αἴρει ὑμῶν. It is remarkable that in both cases λύπη and χαρά are opposed, but λύπη seems to assume a different meaning: in the first case, that of a mother who suffers while giving birth, λύπη seems to mean strong bodily pain (what the Epicureans named ἀλγηδών and the like, an αἴσθησις, not an emotion proper); in the second case, that of the disciples who suffer because Jesus is leaving them, λύπη means affliction and grief. The opposition between λύπη and χαρά was traditional, and we have already mentioned the example of Xenophon for it. In the Epicurean and the Stoic system, the opposite of λύπη, properly speaking, is ἡδονή (this is true of Aristotle as well, as we have indicated above), but in the Stoic perspective it is easily understandable why the negative counterpart of χαρά was found
in λύπη, even though this is a pathos and not a eupatheia like χαρά: because there is no eupatheia that corresponds to λύπη.11 Therefore, the negative counterpart of χαρά had to be found, not in the category of eupatheai, but in that of pathê. And λύπη is a pathos. As a consequence, when John envisages the passage from λύπη to χαρά, he is describing a passage from a pathos to a eupatheia, and indeed he means to depict a very positive passage.

Again in the immediately following verse, Jesus really hammers home the concept of χαρά: the disciples will have to ask Jesus and will obtain what they ask for, and their joy will be, once more, “full” or “perfected” (ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ύμῶν ἔμην πεπληρωμένη). The same expression reappears in the very same speech of Jesus in 17:13, where Jesus is addressing the Father in the presence of his disciples: “now I come to You, and this I say in the world, that they may have my joy perfected / full in themselves (τὴν χαρὰν τὴν ἐμὴν πεπληρωμένην ἐν αὑτοῖς). We have already encountered this idea in 15:11 and 15:24, and indeed 15:11 and 17:13 are the two passages on which Voorwinde has concentrated, for χαρά, in his work on the emotions of Jesus in the Gospel of John. It is important to observe, however, that the joy of Jesus here in John is immediately communicated to his disciples, who have Jesus’ joy – in opposition to the joy of this world – in themselves, and have it full. It is not accidental that the fullness of this joy is mentioned not only in 15:11 and 17:13, in which Jesus’ joy appears along with that of the disciples, but also in 15:24, in which only the disciples’ joy is mentioned, but the expression is identical. The notion of participation, which is so fundamental in John to understand the relationship between the disciples – and, by implication, all Christians – and Jesus, works at the level of joy just as it works at the level of love and unity: to participate in Jesus’ ἀγάπη, to remain in Jesus’ ἀγάπη,12 to participate in Jesus’ unity with the Father (see John 17),13 and to participate in Jesus’ joy, to have Jesus’ joy in oneself.

The only other occurrences of χαίρω and χαρά in John outside this great farewell discourse are three: one is in reference to John the Baptist, who ascribes the joy to the presence of the bridegroom, Jesus, in 3:29 in


emphasizing that he, John, is full of perfect joy because the bridegroom is there (χαρᾷ χαίρει διὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ νυμφίου. αὕτη οὖν ἡ χαρὰ ἡ ἐμὴ πεπλήρωται). Note, again, the notion of the perfection, the fullness of joy, which is typical of the fourth Gospel. The second is in 4:36, in a parable: the one who collects the harvest, the figure of the disciple of Christ, collects a fruit for the world to come, so that he will rejoice together with God, the one who plants (ἳνα ὁ σπείρων ὁμοὶ χαίρῃ καὶ ὁ θερίζων). And the third is in 11:15 in the episode of the resurrection of Lazarus: Jesus says that he rejoices that he was not there with his disciples when Lazarus got ill, because in this way they will be witnesses of his resurrection and will believe: χαίρω δι’ ὑμᾶς, ἵνα πιστεύσητε. The absolute positiveness of joy emerges through its association to faith here, and is evident throughout the gospel.

Some Concluding Remarks on the Gospels
All the Gospels present χαρά as extremely positive, which is perfectly in line with the positivity of this eupatheia in Stoicism. The most developed treatments of χαρά seem to be offered by Luke and John. For Luke this is not surprising, given the refinement of his reflection on λύπη as well, which, as we have already explained, is the negative counterpart of χαρά. In another future chapter of the larger work on πάθη, προπάθειαι, and εὐπάθειαι in the New Testament, Ilaria Ramelli has provided full demonstration of how Luke deliberately changes the other synoptics’ terminology precisely in relation to the pathê-lexicon; as it turns out, Luke displays a refinement in psychological treatment and a connection with the theme of spiritual death. In John, the focus is theological and is almost all in the great farewell discourse on unity in chapters 16-17. Χαρά is opposed to λύπη for by Luke and by John. For John, it is the permanent and inalienable spiritual condition of those who love Jesus and dwell in his love, even if it means tribulation and λύπη in this world, which is opposed to Jesus. Indeed, the notion of the χαρά of this world, as opposed to that of Jesus and his disciples, constitutes the only case in which χαρά bears a negative connotation.

The Remainder of the New Testament: Positive Joy and A Few Exceptions
In the rest of the NT, χαίρω and χαρά appear in the Acts of the Apostles, in Paul’s epistles, in deuto- and pseudo-Pauline letters, and rarely in the letters of James, Peter, and John, and in Revelation. The highest concentration is surely in Paul’s authentic letters, which is a sign of Paul’s special valorization of this eupatheia, and probably also of Paul’s acquaintance with Stoic moral philosophy.14

14 On this see documentation in I. Ramelli, “Philosophen und Prediger: Dion und Pau-
lus – pagane und christliche weise Männer,” in Dion von Prusa. Der Philosoph und sein
As we have shown to be the case in the Gospels, here too joy is always considered positively, apart from two exceptions, the only examples of perverse joy: Rev 11:10, in which the wicked inhabitants of the earth rejoice in the death of the prophets (οἱ κατοικοῦντες ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς χαίροντες καὶ εὐφραίνονται), and James 4:9, in which the author is threatening sinners that their joy will be turned into sadness: ἡ χαρὰ εἰς κατήφειαν. A partial exception is also 1Cor 7:30: τὸ λοιπὸν ὡς μὴ κατέχοντες. Here joy is considered as an adiaphoron, according to the Stoic category, that is, as a thing of this world from which one must detach oneself because the end is close. And in 2Cor 13:9 Paul is speaking ironically: χαίρομεν γὰρ ὅταν ἡμεῖς ἀσθενῶμεν, ὡς ἐτέρων ὦσιν ὡς μὴ χαίροντες. 

Another exception that must be preliminarily cleared is Acts 15:23; 23:26, and 2John 10-11, in which the verb is simply the greeting formula χαίρειν, which in the latter passage is said to imply a communion of works with the person that is thus greeted. See also James 1:1, in which, however, the greeting formula χαίρειν is immediately followed by the exhortation to rejoice: Πᾶσαν χαρὰν ηῇσαθε, which would seem to confer to the formula itself a more pregnant meaning, similar to that which we have pointed out in the angel’s greeting formula to Mary in Luke.

**Paul**

Paul, as I have mentioned, has a high concentration of the χαρά terminology in his authentic letters. It is notable that χαρά is opposed by Paul, too, like by Luke and John, to λύπη and not to ἡδονή, since λύπη has no reasonable counterpart and therefore has no corresponding eupatheia. The aforementioned χαρά–λύπη opposition is found in 2Cor 2:3: ἔγραψα τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἵνα μὴ ἐλθὼν λύπην ἀπ' ὧν ἔδει με χαίρειν, πεποιθὼς ἐπὶ πάντας ὑμᾶς ὅτι ἡ ἐμὴ χαρὰ πάντων ἐστιν. The joy of the apostle is contrasted with sadness if the people he has converted do not live according to the gospel. The case is the same ibidem 6:10, in which Paul, who is speaking of himself in the plural, is χαίρομεν ὡς λυπούμενοι ἀεὶ δὲ χαίροντες, and ibidem 7:9: νῦν χαίρω, οὐχ ὅτι ἐλυπήθητε, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐλυπήθητε εἰς μετάνοιαν. In fact, Paul is saying, joy is not opposed to that kind of affliction that is finalized to repentance and conversion. The author of Hebrews, too, like Paul, opposes χαρά to λύπη and the cross of Christ in 12:2: Ἰησοῦν, οὗ ἀντὶ τῆς προκειμένης αὐτῷ χαρᾶς υπέμεινεν σταυρόν, and 12:11: πᾶσα δὲ παιδεία πρὸς μὲν τὸ παρόν οὐ δοκεί χαρὰς εἰναι ἀλλὰ λύπης. It is probable that the author of Hebrews knew Philo, and it is notable that Philo, who embraced in turn the Stoic classification of pathê and eupatheiai, has
the very same χαρά–λύπη opposition. Philo’s works, according to some scholars, were indeed known to the author of Hebrews. Very recently, Folker Siegert has claimed that, among NT writings, “the clearest evidence of at least indirect Philonic influence are the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Gospel of John.” The former was addressed to Jewish Christians in Rome and, according to some scholars, its author may be Prisca, one of the first apostles and heads of churches; Siegert dates it before A.D. 68 and, while admitting that there is no evidence that Roman Jews possessed Philo’s writings at that time, he deems it safe to assume that the author of Hebrews, like other Jews in Rome, “may have learned of Philo’s teachings orally, even from hearing him directly.”

Paul often associates joy with the Holy Spirit and its “paracletic” or comforting and exhorting function. In 2 Cor 7:4 joy is precisely related by him to the comfort that is the work of the Spirit: πεπλήρωμαι τῇ παρακλήσει, ύπερπερισσεύομαι τῇ χαρᾷ ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ θλίψει ἡμῶν. The same is the case in 2 Cor 7:13, in which joy is again connected with the spirit and comfort: Paul says that he is comforted (παρακεκλήμεθα) because his addressees’ care for him has been manifested, and he adds that he has rejoiced even more in the joy of Titus, because his spirit has been relieved by all the Corinthians: Ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ παρακλήσει ἡμῶν περισσοτέρως μᾶλλον

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16 The main comparative studies of Philo and Hebrews are: C. Spicq, L’Épître aux Hébreux, 1–2, Paris 1952; 1977, who contended that the author of Hebrews was a Philonian who converted to Christianity; S. Sower, The hermeneutics of Philo and Hebrews, Zürich 1965; R. Williamson, Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews, Leiden 1970; K. Dey, The Intermediary World and Patterns of Perfection in Philo and Hebrews, Missoula, Mo. 1975, who does not see specific contact between Philo and Hebrews, but admits that they probably had a common cultural background; L. Hurst, The Epistle to the Hebrews: Its Background of Thought, Cambridge 1990, according to whom it is not proven that Hebrews had Philo and Middle Platonism in its intellectual background (which is admitted by H. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, Philadelphia 1989, 29, and D. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey, Minneapolis 1993, 78 as well); K. Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo, Louisville 2005, esp. 73–96, who advocates close similarities in the conception of the Logos, the interpretation of the Tabernacle, and the representation of angels (see esp. 82–4, and all 74–86 for convergences with Hebrews). Idem, “Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews: Ronald Williamson’s Study after Thirty Years,” StudPhilon 14, 2002, 112–35, notes that the main difference is that Hebrews is eschatologically oriented, while Philo is not, and that the latter allegorizes Scripture, while Hebrews does not, but the similarities are more remarkable; he calls attention to the quotations from the OT that are uniquely common to Hebrews and to Philo. See also G. Steyn, “Torah Quotations Common to Philo, Hebrews, Clemens Romanus, and Justin Martyr”, in C. Breytenbach, J. Thom, J. Punt (eds.), The New Testament Interpreted, Leiden 2006, 135–51, who thinks that the author of Hebrews was acquainted with Philo’s works, and wrote from Alexandria to Christians in Rome.


18 Siegert, “Philo”, 177–8.
Paul presents joy straightforward as a gift from the Holy Spirit in 1Thess 1:6: ὑμεῖς μιμηταὶ ἡμῶν ἐγενήθητε καὶ τοῦ κυρίου, δεξάμενοι τὸν λόγον ἐν θλίψει πολλῆ μετὰ χαρᾶς πνεῦματος ἁγίου. Here it is interesting that for the Lord, for Paul, and for the Thessalonians, tribulation in the world is accompanied by joy from the divine Spirit (the same contrast returns in Hebr 10:34: τὴν ἁρπαγὴν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὑμῶν μετὰ χαρᾶς προσεδέξασθε, γινώσκοντες ἐχεῖν ἑαυτοὺς κρείττονα ὑπάρξιν καὶ μένουσαν. And a similar oxymoronic relationship is drawn in Acts 5:41, in which joy is said to derive from dishonor, but a dishonor suffered for the sake of the name of Christ: Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπορεύοντο χαίροντες ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ συνεδρίου ὅτι κατηξιώθησαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀτιμασθῆναι). And Paul associates joy with comfort and love in Phil 7: χαρὰν γὰρ πολλὴν ἔσχον καὶ παράκλησιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀγάπῃ σου. Love itself, in 1Cor 13:6, is said to rejoice, of course not in iniquity, but in the truth: Ἡ ἀγάπη ... οὕτως ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμερήσια, συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: In Rom 14:17, joy is considered to be authentic if it is in the Holy Spirit: οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ Basileia τοῦ θεοῦ βρόσας καὶ πόσις, άλλα δικαιοσύνη καὶ εἰρήνη καὶ χαρὰ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. In Rom 15:13, likewise, joy is linked with the Holy Spirit and with hope, just as in 1Thess 2:19-20, in which Paul calls the Christians he has converted his “hope,” “joy,” and “motive for pride” (τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἠλπίς ἡ χαρά ... ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἐστε ἡ δόξα ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ χαρά: cf. Phil 4:1: ἢ δέλφοι μου ἡ ἀγάπη καὶ ἐπιθυμητοί, χαρὰ καὶ στέφανος μου), and in Rom 12:12: τῇ ἐλπίδι χαίροντες ... χαίρειν μετὰ χαίροντων. Interestingly, the connection between joy and the Spirit is drawn, not only by Paul, but also by the author of Acts as well in 13:52: while Paul and Barnabas are chased from a city, joy fills the disciples together with the Holy Spirit, thanks to the preaching of the Gospel: οἵ τε μαθηταὶ ἐπληροῦντο χαρᾶς καὶ πνεῦματος ἁγίου. The association of joy with the Holy Spirit is not accidental, since the Spirit is presented as comforting and exhortative (παρακλητός < παρακαλέω).

Paul repeatedly urges his addressees to rejoice. The best example for the insistence on this motif is surely Philippians, but this is by no means the only letter. Paul exhorts Christians in Philippi to always rejoice in the Lord, and emphasizes his exhortation with an iteration (Phil 4:4): Χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ πάντοτε πάλιν ἐρωτευμένοις, χαίρετε. He has already said this a few lines before, in 3:1: χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ, and in 2:17-18 he has already highlighted this notion, which is central to this letter, joining it to that of the sharing of joy: χαίροντες καὶ συγχαίρετε πάλιν ἐς υἱὸν τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑμῶν χαίρετε καὶ συγχαίρετε μοι. In Phil 1:4 Paul himself prays “with joy” for the Philippians: μετὰ χαρᾶς τὴν δέησιν ποιοῦντος, and in 2:28-29 he urges the community to receive “with all joy possible” his own envoy: ἐσπέρησεν ἡμῖν ἐν κυρίῳ πάλιν χαίροντες καὶ συγχαίρετε μοι προσδέχεσθε συναρχόμενοι.
χαράς. And he exhorts them to be unanimous, so to fill him, Paul, with joy: πληρώσατε μοι τὴν χαρὰν ἵνα το αὐτὸ φρονῆτε (Phil 2:2; cf. 1 Cor 12:26: δοξάζεται ἐν μέλος, συγχαίρει πάντα τὰ μέλη). Likewise, in 1Thess 5:16 he exhorts Christians in Thessaloniki to rejoice all time, evidently in Christ, and to pray uninterruptedly: Πάντοτε χαίρετε, ἀδιαλείπτως προσεύχεσθε. The exhortation to joy also appears in the final recommendations in 2Cor 13:11: Λοιπὸν, ἀδελφοί, χαίρετε. This is a hallmark of Paul in his letters to his communities.

The element with which joy is most often associated by Paul is by far that of faith. Not only Paul himself and other apostles, but also the converts are full of joy thanks to their faith in the Gospel, in 2 Cor 1:24: οὐχ ὅτι κυριεύομεν ύμῶν τῆς πίστεως, ἀλλὰ συνεργοὶ ἐσμεν τῆς χαρᾶς ύμῶν, τῇ γὰρ πίστει ἑστήκατε. Likewise, in 2Cor 7:16 Paul rejoices because the Christian community in Corinth encourage him, clearly in keeping their faith steadfast and in behaving well: χαίρων τῆς πίστεως. Joy is related to the Spirit and faith by Paul in Gal 5:22: Ὅ τε καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐστιν ἀγάπη, χαρὰ, εἰρήνη, μακροθυμία, χρηστότης, ἀγαθωσύνη, πίστις. Also in Phil 1:25, joy is given by faith: χαίρων τῆς πίστεως. In Phil 1:18 the reason for Paul to rejoice is that Christ is being preached: Χριστὸς καταγγέλλεται, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ χαίρων ἀλλὰ καὶ χαρήσομαι. In Rom 15:32 Paul anticipates his missionary trip to Rome, which will be done in joy: ἤπειρον καὶ ἐλθὼν πρὸς υμᾶς διὰ τῆς τελείματος θεοῦ συναναπαύσομαι ύμῖν.

Like in other parts of the NT, joy is associated with the diffusion of the Christian faith everywhere. This is also why Paul in Rom 16:19 says to rejoice in the Christians of Rome (ἐφ' ύμῖν οὖν χαίρω) and in his collaborators (χαίρων δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ Στεφανᾶ καὶ Φορτουνᾶτος καὶ Αχαϊκοῦ, 1 Cor 16:17). In 1 Thess 3:9 the joy, which is underscored as very much, is that of Paul for the diffusion of faith in Christ: πάσῃ τῇ χαρᾷ ἡ χαίρομεν νῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμῶν. The exceeding measure of the joy is underlined by Paul also in 2Cor 7:16: ἐπὶ τῆς χαρᾶς αὐτῶν.

DEUTERO- AND PSEUDO-PAULINE WORKS IN THE NT

Likewise, Paul’s imitator, the author of 2Timothy, one of the so-called Pastoral Epistles, in 1:4 says that he fills with joy the thought of Timothy’s faith: ἐν χαρᾷ τῆς πληρωθῶ, ὑπόμνησιν λαβὼν τῆς ἐν σοὶ ἀνυποκρίτου πίστεως. And in Col 2:5 the author rejoices in seeing the Colossians’ steadfastness in their faith in Christ: χαίρων καὶ βλέπων ύμῶν τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὸ στερέωμα τῆς εἰς Χριστὸν πίστεως ύμῶν. The same idea underlies Col 1:11 μετὰ χαρᾶς εὐχαριστοῦντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ἰκανόσαντι ύμᾶς εἰς τὴν μερίδα τοῦ κληροῦ τῶν ἀγίων.

Not only Paul and his imitators, but also the author of 1Peter relates joy to faith in 1:8-9: ὃν οὐκ ἰδόντες ἁγαπάτε, εἰς ὃν ἦρα τῇ ὁρώντες πιστεύοντες
Provided that he is not Paul, which however is debated, the author of Colossians presents an interesting reflection on the joy that comes from suffering, in that he relates it to the sufferings of Christ. In Col 1:24, indeed, he says that he rejoices in his own sufferings for the sake of the Colossians, because he is completing those of Christ himself: χαίρω ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, καὶ ἀντανακλητό τὰ ùστερήματα τῶν θλίψεων τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

In Hebr 13:17 the chiefs of the Christian community that the author is addressing are said to lose sleep for the benefit of the souls of their flock, and to do so with joy, μετὰ χαρᾶς, which is opposed to στενάζοντες.

**Peter and John Letters, and Revelation**

In 1 Peter, of which we have already spoken, at 4:13 the author exhorts his readers to rejoice in their sharing in Christ’s sufferings, that they may also rejoice when the glory of Christ will be revealed: καθὼς κοινωνεῖτε τοῖς παθήμασι τοῦ Χριστοῦ, χαίρετε, ἵνα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ χαίρετε, ἀγαλλιώμενοι.

To a lesser extent vis-à-vis Paul, but not at all without emphasis, and with an eye to the joy motif that we have pointed out in the gospel of John, the Johannine letters develop the theme of joy, both of the writer himself and of the addressees. In 1 John 1:4, John says to have written his letter that his recipients’ joy may be full: ταῦτα γράφομεν ἡμεῖς ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ἡμῶν ᾖ πεπληρωμένη. The same is repeated in 2 John 12. The motif of the fullness of the disciples’ joy is identical to that which we have already pointed out in the Gospel of John. In 3 John 4, the joy of the apostle depends on the right faith and behavior of the Christians his recipients: μειξότερα τούτων ὁ ἤχος χαράν, ἵνα ἀκούω τὰ ἐμὰ τέκνα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ περιπατοῦντα. The wording is very similar to that of John 15:13, which is either by the same author or by an author who was closely inspired by the Gospel: μείζονα ταύτης ἀγάπην οὐδεὶς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῇ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ.

In Rev 19:7, the appeal to joy, χαίρωμεν καὶ ἀγαλλιώμεν, is motivated both by the advent of the Kingdom of God (v. 6) and by the wedding of the tiny Lamb with his bride made immaculate. The very same couple of verbs appears, as we have shown, in Matthew 5:12, χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλίωσθε, and in Luke 1:14, in which Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, is announced by the angel that he will have “joy and exultancy” (ἔσται χαρά σοι καὶ ἀγαλλίασις) for the birth of baby John.

**Acts**

In Acts 8:8 joy, and much joy, is said to be aroused by the healing, physical and spiritual (from “unclean spirits”), performed by the apostles: πολλοί
γὰρ τῶν ἐχόντων πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα βοῶντα φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἐξήρχοντο, πολλοὶ δὲ παραλελυμένοι καὶ χωλοὶ ἐθεραπεύθησαν· ἐγένετο δὲ πολλὴ χαρά ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐκείνῃ. The same is the case in Acts 15:3, in which the conversion of pagans is the reason for the Christians’ joy, and, again, “a great joy”: Oἱ μὲν οὖν προπεμφθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας διήρχοντο τὴν τε Φοινίκην καὶ Σαμάρειαν ἐκδιηγούμενοι τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν, καὶ ἐποίουν χαράν μεγάλην πᾶσιν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς.

In Acts 12:14 joy is felt by a young girl, Rhode,19 who is so happy that Peter is at the door, while beforehand he was in prison, that she leaves him knocking and, forgetting to open the door, runs and tells the others inside – they are gathered in the house of Mark – that Peter is there. κρούσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν θύραν τοῦ πυλῶνος προσῆλθεν παιδίσκη ὑπακοῦσαι ὀνόματι Ῥόδη· καὶ ἐπιγνοῦσα τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ Πέτρου ἀπὸ τῆς χαρᾶς οὐκ ἤνοιξεν τὸν πυλῶνα, εἰσδραμοῦσα δὲ ἐπηγγέλει ἐστάναι τὸν Πέτρον πρὸ τοῦ πυλῶνος. And in Acts 8:39 it is the eunuch who has just been converted by Philip to Christianity that rejoices, evidently because of his new acquisition of the Christian faith: πνεῦμα κυρίου ἥρπασεν τὸν Φίλιππον, καὶ οὐκ εἶδεν αὐτὸν οὐκέτι ὁ εὐνοῦχος· ἐπορεύετο γὰρ τὴν ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ χαῖρων.

GENERAL CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

It is evident from this investigation that the New Testament notion and treatment of χαρά is indebted above all to the Stoic conception of χαρά and εὐπάθεια. For in Stoicism, χαρά, qua eupatheia, had acquired a full positivity, in that it was considered to be an emotion that is specific to the sage, and is never grounded in any wrong belief. And in the New Testament, χαρά seems to be used principally in connection with the kind of joy that derives from God and belief in Christ as his son. It is a transcendental joy, as opposed to pleasure or ἡδονή, an extremely rare term in the New Testament, as we have remarked. The use of χαρά in the LXX, too, as we have pointed out, emerges precisely in those, more recent, books which are in turn already characterized by the influence of Hellenism.

And this of χαρά is but one example of the influence of Hellenistic moral philosophy, and especially Stoic ethics, on the NT, within the much larger panorama of πάθη, προπάθειαι, and εὐπάθειαι in the NT. Even more broadly, beyond the sphere of the emotions, the impact of Stoicism on Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, the Gospels, and most of the NT is being more and more detected and assessed in scholarship.

19 For a possible parallel with the novels, and in particular, a resonance with the name “Rhode,” see D. Konstan, “Perpetua’s Martyrdom and the Metamorphosis of Narrative”, in J. Bremmer and M. Formisano (eds.), Perpetua’s Passions, Oxford 2010.