
The book to be reviewed here is the first substantial commentary on Lucian’s “Teacher of Rhetoric”.¹ The author, a young Swiss scholar, has produced a very ample volume: almost 500 pages for only 10 pages of Greek text – this may be almost too much of a good thing. For some parts of the book, at least, a bit less might actually have been more.

Already the introductory chapters take up almost 140 pages. First we get an introduction to the piece itself (p. 11-88). After providing a short summary and “structural-rhetorical analysis” of the text (p. 11-7), Zweimüller follows this up with a “more detailed disposition guided by rhetorical aspects” (p. 18-29). A subsequent section on “literary styling and intertextuality” (p. 29-34) for the first time reveals one of the central (but in my view not unproblematic) tenets of Zweimüller’s interpretation of this Lucianic text: she believes that the (intended) result of the “Teacher of Rhetoric” is a fundamental aporia of the reader, as the text in her view “calls into question” (p. 33) both the old traditional rhetoric personified by the crusty and robust teacher described in ch. 9-10 and the flashy new rhetoric embodied by the text’s title figure who makes his appearance in ch. 11.² Though she acknowledges that other Lucianic texts give quite straightforward answers in favour of the good old rhetoric (ibid.), she is apparently not willing to consider that one might find a similar stance here, at least suggested in-between the lines.

In the next section, Zweimüller looks into “Platonic-philosophical elements” in this text (p. 34-43). She regards the title figure as a “false Socrates” (p. 35) and detects Socratic-Platonic characteristics also in the “introductory adviser” (p. 36), with whose remarks the text begins (and also ends). She believes that the beginning of our text contains a special reminiscence of the (Pseudo-)Platonic Alcibiades I (p. 37), but one might also consider whether the beginning of the Protagoras (with Hippocrates’ wish to get acquainted with the famous teacher Protagoras as soon as possible) is perhaps even more relevant. Other Platonic reference texts for Rhetorum Praeceptor are in Zweimüller’s view the Seventh Letter and the Phaedrus (p. 37-9). Her conclusion, however, that the “Teacher of Rhetoric” is “an essay on rhetoric in philosophical guise” (p. 40) seems a bit bold. More to the point may be her comparison of the advocates of the “short way” to rhetoric to Cynic philosophers (p. 41), who advocated a similarly short

¹ There is a section on it (p. 42-50) in M. Weissenberger, Literaturtheorie bei Lukian. Untersuchungen zum Dialog Lexiphanes, Stuttgart - Leipzig 1996.
² On p. 46 and 47 she even talks of the “nihilism” of Rhetorum Praeceptor!
way to philosophy and whose behaviour is similarly rude as that of the Teacher of Rhetoric – he might, then, in some ways be regarded as a perverted Cynic.

The following section looks at two literary forerunners of the motif of the “two ways” so prominent in Rhetorum Praeceptor: Prodicus’ allegorical tale and the Tabula Cebetis (p. 43-7). After this, Zweimüller discusses the imagery of the two (or sometimes more) ways between which somebody has to choose in other Lucianic writings, namely the “autobiographical” ones and the Hermotimus (p. 47-59). She detects a similarity between the disenchanted “adviser” at the end of Rhetorum Praeceptor and the “Syrian” in Bis Accusatus, but also recognizes a fundamental difference between the two: the “Syrian” has left rhetoric and found something better, namely dialogue, while the “adviser” only declares his willingness to drop rhetoric, but has not found anything else instead. This difference, however, in my opinion precludes that the “Syrian” is really comparable to the “adviser” (as Zweimüller claims on p. 47 n. 118, even connecting the “Syrian” with the effeminacy of the “teacher of rhetoric” himself!) and that the solution offered at the end of Bis Accusatus (namely, switching to another literary genre) is applicable to Rhetorum Praeceptor. More to the point is the subsequent comparison with Somnium (p. 49-55): by showing the analogies of Rhetorum Praeceptor to Somnium, Zweimüller well brings out an inherent contradiction in the latter piece (i.e. on the one hand the traditional content of the paideia praised in it, on the other the promise that this content may be mastered quickly). Less convincing are Zweimüller’s efforts to draw a close comparison between Rhetorum Praeceptor and Hermotimus (p. 55-7): Lucian certainly uses some of the same imagery in both pieces, but he does so in other writings as well, so this is not enough to establish a close connection. One may claim that Rhetorum Praeceptor does not present an (explicit) positive alternative at the end, but it is simply not true that Hermotimus does the same: it rejects all dogmatic philosophy and shows the benefits of living a life of hands-on virtue combined with a healthy scepticism.

After this, Zweimüller turns to the imagery of the “two ways” in Rhetorum Praeceptor itself (p. 59-67). Here she elaborates on her belief that Lucian creates a fundamental aporia in this piece, depicting both the “long way” and the “short way” to rhetoric as basically equivalent, in that both of them direct their followers to a “wrong” kind of rhetoric (p. 61): the reader (so Zweimüller suggests) has to look for a “third” kind of rhetoric that would avoid the mistakes of the other two, but not even a shadow of that third kind can be found anywhere in this piece. In her characterisation of the “initial adviser” (p. 62-4) Zweimüller rightly stresses that this man is presented as a frustrated former proponent of the traditional “long way” to rhetoric – but does this mean that his repudiation of his own rhetorical upbringing is meant to throw a bad light on this kind of rhetoric itself?3 It could also mean that this man, too, has fallen victim to the

3 In some places, Zweimüller herself comes close to regarding the old rhetoric as the really good one: e.g. p. 65 (“eine bessere inhaltliche Ausbildung wird dem langen Weg durchaus attestiert”); p. 74 (Lucian “macht sich … auch für die traditionellen Qualitäten der Rhetorik stark”).
showy pretensions of the vulgar proponent(s) of the new kind of rhetoric. His now proclaimed aversion to the good old rhetoric might thus be just an illustration of his personal shortcomings. According to Zweimüller, the last chapter (26) of *Rhetorum Praeceptor* is meant to stimulate the search for a “new solution” (i.e. a new and better kind of rhetoric), but the words of the chapter themselves do not readily lend themselves to such an interpretation. Taking her cue from the adviser’s tale (in ch. 5) about a Sidonian who tried to persuade Alexander the Great that there was a shortcut from Persia to Egypt, Zweimüller wants to regard the adviser as a deliberately clownish figure (“Narrenfigur”, p. 63) and even as a clownish mask of Lucian himself (p. 64) – well, if there is an analogy between this Sidonian and the adviser, it might also be that both make extravagant promises that nobody can take serious. Zweimüller also considers the adviser and the “teacher of rhetoric” himself (to whom the adviser leaves the stage in ch. 12) to be virtually identical, claiming that the adviser “plays” the teacher in a kind of prosopopoeia. Zweimüller then takes the title figure (the “teacher of rhetoric” himself, who makes his stage appearance in ch. 12) as a similar clown figure (p. 64-5). At the end of this section Zweimüller returns to the figure of the adviser and regards him as a symptom of the decline of contemporary rhetoric, but at the same time does not see (and rightly so) a “nihilistic” conclusion of *Rhetorum Praeceptor* (p. 66-7). Lucian, in fact, has clear ideas about “good” rhetoric, as we can see in others of his writings; I suspect, however, that these ideas are more in tune with the old rhetoric denigrated by question-able figures in *Rhetorum Praeceptor* than with the “third” kind of rhetoric that Zweimüller wants to find.

With the following section on Lucian’s *prolalai* (p. 67-78), Zweimüller diverges somewhat from the text she wants to elucidate; one may well ask whether this section (while not uninteresting in itself) is really necessary for this book. Hereafter, Zweimüller discusses possible intertextual links of *Rhetorum Praeceptor* to Aristophanes and Old Comedy (p. 79-88). She detects certain similarities between the rivalry of the teacher of the long old way towards mastering rhetoric and the teacher of the new shortcut in Lucian’s piece and the agon between κρείττων λόγος and ἥττων λόγος in *Clouds*, but she agrees with Bompaire’s assessment that there is only a “rapprochement très superficiel” between these passages (p. 81). Nevertheless she claims that features of the Aristophanic

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4 She repeats this claim on p. 83 and 170 (on p. 191, she calls the teacher a “proxy” [“Stellvertreter”] of the adviser). However, the very words by which the adviser makes room for the “teacher of rhetoric” (ch. 12) in my opinion preclude this possibility: the adviser asserts that he could only be a very bad actor/impersonator (ὑποκριτὴν) of this teacher and would destroy his hero in the effort (συντρίψω … τὸν ἥρωα δὲν ὑποκρίνομαι) – so why should he then go on and do just that, i.e. take over the role of teacher? Zweimüller’s claim (p. 270) that these words are “self-deprecating” is a petitio principii.

5 On pp. 230-1, however, she asserts a fundamental similarity between the Aristophanic agon and the competing figures of the “old” and the “new” teacher in *Rhet. Praec.*
Socrates are present both in the figure of the adviser and in the figure of the teacher of rhetoric himself, though she has to concede that there are also remarkable differences. Some of her efforts to bring *Rhetorum Praeceptor* into line with *Clouds* in fact seem rather far-fetched: The similarities in phrasing she cites (p. 80 n. 224) are too few, too unspecific and therefore unconvincing; her proposal (p. 83, repeated p. 170) to understand the title-phrase ῥητόρων διδάσκαλος as “director/stage-manager of orators” (in analogy to the διδάσκαλοι of the classical Athenian stage) is ingenious but implausible; her claim (p. 84) that the adviser’s concluding sentences (in which he distances himself from the “new” rhetoric) are a “weakened version” of Strepsiades’ furious destruction of Socrates’ *phrontisterion* at the end of *Clouds* is downright wishful thinking; and her assertion (ibid.) that the adviser unites in himself traits of the Platonic Socrates, the Aristophanic Socrates and even the Aristophanic Strepsiades⁶ shows the dangers of going too far in this game of “which reproduces which?”: if everything can be anything, we are left with nothing at all.

With this, the first chapter of the introduction ends. The second chapter (p. 89-107) deals with the roles and characteristics of ἀπαίδευτοι and πεπαιδευμένοι within the Second Sophistic. After giving a survey of the socio-cultural background (p. 89-93), Zweimüller turns to the role and meaning of (good) education and the lack of it in Lucian’s *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, *Soloecista*, and *Adversus Indoctum* (p. 93-107). There is in fact very little about *Rhetorum Praeceptor* itself in this chapter, and thus it might have been better to publish it as a separate article.

The same holds true for much of the next (and last) big chapter of the introduction, which deals not with good and bad orators, but with real and pseudo-philosophers, trying to find parallels of Lucian’s mocking depiction of the latter with his mockery of bad orators/sophists in *Rhetorum Praeceptor* (p. 108-47). A first (and rather long) section (p. 110-25) is devoted to Lucian’s very positive presentation of the philosopher Demonax, but in the end Zweimüller’s efforts to find general points of contact⁷ look very strained, forcing her to declare that *Rhetorum Praeceptor* combines concepts from philosophy, comedy and the forms of dialogue found in both these genres (p. 123); by trying to make everything fit, she turns this piece into a really Protean changeling. – Her next section (again a rather extensive one: p. 125-41) deals with Lucian’s mockery of philosophers in *Piscator und Fugitivi*. The parallels between the sham philosophers in these works and the sham orators in *Rhetorum Praeceptor* are well brought out (p. 138-41), but Lucian’s typical treatment of charlatans in various professions

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⁶ I have to confess that I simply do not understand her remark that “die nicht agierende Figur des Schülers in Rh. Pr. an den aristophanischen Text ausgelagert [ist]” (ibid.): how can a text “outsource” something to another text that is more than five hundred years older?

⁷ One need not deny specific points of contact, but it might have been better to deal with them in the respective parts of the commentary.
was already well-known before Zweimüller’s book. The third (and final) section of this chapter (p. 142–7) looks at the figure of the “pseudo-pepaideumenos” (“Scheingebildeter”) in Lucian’s oeuvre in general; again, Zweimüller’s findings have largely been preempted by others.

After a short prefatory note on text and translation (p. 148–9), the translation (presented with facing text on pp. 151–69) is written in very readable German. In some places, corrections should be considered. I do not think that rendering γνῶναί … τὰ δέοντα in ch. 1 with “zu wissen, was [gesagt werden] muss” hits the right note: “recognize what must be done” would be more appropriate. In the fourth sentence of ch. 3, σοι (“for you”) has been omitted. In ch. 4, ῥήτορα … καταστήναι should be translated with “to become an orator”, not with “jemanden … zu einem Redner zu machen” (that would be καταστήσαι), in ch. 5, διαθείν τοὺς γραμματοφόρους would be more correctly rendered by “that letter-carriers should hurry (everywhere)” (instead of by “Briefboten zu schicken”), and at the beginning of ch. 6, μὴ σὺ γε πάθης τὸ αὐτό means “do you not get the same impression!” (i.e. that a promise of something unexpected is untrustworthy) and not “Doch dir soll das nicht passieren”. In ch. 10, λόγοι πάλαι καταστημένους are not “längst verscharfte Wörter”, but “long-buried speeches” (as is proved by the subsequent allusion to the orators Demosthenes and Aeschines), and in ch. 11, τὰ τέθριππα … τοῦ λόγου more likely means “the chariot of discourse” than “das Viergespann des Wortes”. The words με ῥητόρων τὸν ἀριστον προσειπών in ch. 13 should be translated with “saluting me as the best of orators”, not with “indem er mich zum besten Redner ernannete [appointed]”. In ch. 19, the phrase πεπληρωκέναι οἶου τὴν ἁρμονίαν is wrongly rendered with “achte dabei auf eine vollendete Satzmelodie”; the words mean “consider the music of your sentence complete” (transl. Harmon). In the same chapter, ἢν … ὀρθοὶ ἑστήκωσι means “if they (already) stand upright”, not “wenn sie sich … aufrichten”. In ch. 26, Harmon renders the words τῇ Ῥητορικῇ ἐπιπολάζων with “trifling with Rhetoric”, which, considering the connotation of ἐπιπολάζων, is more accurate than the neutral “meine Beschäftigung mit der Rhetorik”.

8 There is a lucid typology of this ubiquitous Lucianic figure already in Chr. Robinson, Lucian and his influence. London 1979, 18-20 and 34-5, whom Zweimüller cites in other places but not here, where it would have been very appropriate. See also J. Gerlach, “Die Figur des Scharlatans bei Lukian”, in: P. Pilhofer et al., Lukian, Der Tod des Peregrinos (SAPERE 9), Darmstadt 2005, 151-97 (not cited here either, though later on p. 209 n. 571).

9 See above note 8.

10 The expression is taken from Thuc. 2.60.5 and means “knowing what is requisite” (transl. by Thomas Hobbes) there, too.

11 Zweimüller gets it wrong again on p. 249 (“Ausgraben von uraltem Vokabular”), but right in n. 648 (“… indem zusammen mit den »alten Leichen« ihre Werke (Λόγοι) ausgegraben werden”) and right again on p. 321 n. 851.

12 Some mistaken translations of Greek are also found in other parts of the volume: On p. 115, Zweimüller’s etymological explanation of Ὑπερείδης as “he who leans (ἐρείδω) on a cud-
There follows the most substantial part of the book, the commentary itself (p. 170-477). It contains a treasure-trove of valuable information, but it is not free from flaws.

Let me first point out some questionable assertions or mistakes: On p. 176, Zweimüller tries to show that Ἕλληνες can mean “all people in the world”, but the references she cites do not bear her out: in Plat. Alc. I 105b and 124b, Isocr. Hel. 52 Ἕλληνες is twinned with βαρβαροῖ to mean all human beings; in Plat. Hipp. mai. 291a, Men. 70a, Prot. 335a, Isocr. Panath. pass. Luc. Pseudol. 14, Herod. 1, Zeux. 2 and Dio or. 50,2 Ἕλληνες just means “Greeks”. On p. 185, δέδιθι is called a “nachklassische Form”, because it can be found just once in classical Greek and 80 times in Greek texts of Roman Imperial Times. The one instance in classical Greek, however, is in Aristophanes (Vesp. 373) – are we supposed to think that Aristophanes wrote “nachklassisch”? On p. 212, the comparison of Tabula Cebetis with Rhet. Praec. is inexact (there is no real dialogue in...
Philopatris is wrongly reckoned among the authentic writings of Lucian on p. 367, Rhesus among the authentic plays of Euripides on p. 405 (also 437). On p. 440 Zweimüller asks, how it can be possible that a person can be homonymous with two people (as the teacher of Rhetoric claims in ch. 24); well, as the two people involved are the Dioskuroi, he might perhaps have been called Dioskoros.

Not all comments are relevant for Rhet. Praec.: p. 188, on ἵππηλατον (ch. 3); p. 191 n. 124 on ὀλισθηρός (ch. 3); p. 245 n. 644 on Olympiads. Sometimes we get very basic comments on points of Greek school grammar (p. 222). On the other hand, there are some omissions as well: On p. 324, one is surprised to find no entry on the word σπανιώκις used in ch. 17.14

Every now and then, there is a tendency to speculate about things, where the text will simply not provide enough “hard facts”: I do, e.g., not see what we win from considering the Sidonian merchant in the anecdote related in ch. 5 as a “fool”; Zweimüller devotes three pages, 199–201, to this question, without coming to a definite conclusion. On p. 204, she takes two short references to Egypt (in ch. 5 and 6) as a starting-point to muse about Egypt as a “place of wisdom”, but nothing calls for this interpretation here. Nor is there enough in the text of ch. 7 to identify Heracles as the exponent of the “hard way” and Dionysus as the exponent of the “easy” one.15 To see an allusion to the ἀγρυπνία of a brooding overnight-worker in the positively connoted ἐγρηγορώς in ch. 9 (p. 236), seems far-fetched; similarly far-fetched seems the claim that the adjective χειρίσοφος used in ch. 17 should remind us of the Spartan commander Cheirisophos in Xenophon’s Anabasis and lead us on to think about the Persian Wars (p. 332). – Wright, the Loeb editor of Philostratus is a woman; so it should be “in ihrer Ausgabe” on p. 361, not “in seiner”.

In some instances, Zweimüller exhibits a curious disregard for chronology.16 On p. 280, she calls Libanius a “contemporary” of Lucian; actually there lie about two hundred years between them. It is remarkable, too, that on p. 357 the battles of Artemision, Salamis, and Plataeae are dated “um 480 v. Chr.” and “um 479 v.
Chr.” respectively – why not “im Jahr …”? On p. 414, Zweimüller cites a reference from the historian Theopompus as “un-classical”, but he wrote in the 4th century BC.

There are also a number of formal infelicities. Very strangely, Zweimüller treats reference works and encyclopedias, as if they were monolithic volumes produced by a totally anonymous authorship: she never provides any names of authors for articles from collective works like *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, *Der Neue Pauly*, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, *Cambridge Ancient History*, *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*. This is a rather demeaning attitude towards many authors who spent considerable time and effort to produce reliable articles for such works of reference.¹⁷ There is also a strange inconsistency in citing references: on the one hand, Zweimüller cites only book- and chapter-numbers from Herodotus (without paragraphs), chapter-numbers from Plutarch’s *Lives* (again mostly without paragraphs), and Aristotle passages without Bekker’s line-numbering, thus leaving it to the reader to find quotations within often very long tracts of text; on the other hand she cites not only paragraph-numbers but also superfluous line numbers (clearly taken from the electronic TLG) for authors like Demosthenes, Lucian, Pollux and many others. Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistai* are sometimes cited by book and chapter (p. 223), sometimes by book and pagination (p. 272, 316). Euripides fragments are still cited according to Nauck (p. 256–7).¹⁸

The last section (p. 478–83) of the book – before bibliography and indices¹⁹ – considers the *Nachleben* of *Rhetorum Praeceptor* and especially two instances

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¹⁷ On p. 136 n. 434, she cites an epigram from the *Anthologia Palatina*, as if it were anonymous (“II.54”); in fact, its author is the poet Palladas who lived about two hundred years later than Lucian. In general, she treats poems in the *Anthologia Palatina* as an indistinct mass of texts without any regard for different authorship or date of origin (see, e.g., p. 140 n. 444, p. 243.


¹⁹ Considering (again) the bulk of the book, the indices are a bit disappointing: The *index locorum* provides only references to Lucianic writings. Zweimüller could have doubled or
of its influence, namely on the work of the humanists Pirckheimer and Erasmus. In my opinion, there is a tendency here to overstate the importance of this Lucianic piece. One would have to point out much more specific points of contact than Zweimüller does; those that she does point out fail to be really convincing. Let me give an example: As verbal allusions to *Rhet. Praec.* in Erasmus’ famous *Encomium Moriae,* she cites the expressions ὅτι κεν ἐπ’ ἀκαιρίμαν γλῶτταν ἔλθῃ and ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνήροτα, but the first can also be found in *Hist. Conscr.* 32, and the second is in fact not found in *Rhet. Praec.* at all (only in the variation ἄσπορα καὶ ἀνήροτα), but in *Phalaris* 2.8 and *Parasite* 24. This finding is significant: it is not enough to find expressions or themes in later literature that are present also in *Rhet. Praec.,* but one has to show there are specific allusions traceable only to *Rhet. Praec.* This Zweimüller has failed to do.

One final word regarding Zweimüller’s general approach to the piece to which she has devoted so much time and effort. She claims that “ambivalence” is one of the basic traits of *Rhet. Praec.,* that both the “old” rhetoric of classical times and the “new” rhetoric of the title figure are found wanting and that therefore the reader somehow has to find another third way (which, however, is nowhere explicitly advocated). In my opinion, things might in fact be a bit simpler. In many places Zweimüller takes the pronouncements of the adviser (who appears in the first and the last section of the piece and not only introduces the teacher of the “new” rhetoric but also makes disparaging comments on the teacher of the “old” one) too much at face-value and too seriously (e.g. p. 230, 232, 234, 237, 242, 458). This character in fact is a seriously flawed figure himself, having proved himself incapable both of sticking to the “old” rhetoric and of converting to the “new” one – why should his criticism of the teacher of the “old” rhetoric have any value at all? Seen from this perspective, “old” rhetoric and its teaching might even be regarded as vindicated, because the alternatives are so appalling. Thus, *Rhetorum Praeceptor* would not teach a lesson different from that of *Lexiphanes,* but the same one, only by another method.

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20 On p. 480 n. 1307, Zweimüller even claims that *Rhet. Praec.* exerted influence on Morus’ *Utopia* and Holberg’s *Nils Klims* – one would very much like to see that demonstrated in detail.

21 This variation also appears in *Merc. Cond.* 3 and *Sat.* 7.

22 “Ambivalence” is a favourite word throughout the book, as a short glance at the index entry “Ambivalenz” reveals.

23 Only intermittently she recognizes the adviser’s skewed perspective (e.g. p. 235, 236, 239).