
This book discusses the major instances of silenced speech in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* and connects them to Ovid’s self-representation as “speechless” in his exile poetry. A rich, fairly recent body of scholarship has identified speech deprivation as a major issue in Ovid’s later poetry, observing in particular the close association between speech loss and issues of gender. Natoli takes a new approach. Applying schema theory, he identifies a bipartite pattern for speech loss in the *Metamorphoses* and the exile poetry, namely its association with the nonhuman and the emotional, displayed through animality and isolation from human community. Natoli’s main focus is Ovid’s exile poetry; the *Metamorphoses* establishes schematic patterns and mythological characters that prefigure the linguistic crisis of exile.

The book has four chapters as well as an introduction that usefully surveys the main scholarship on Ovid’s exile poetry. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of schema theory and shows its applicability to ancient conceptions of speechlessness. Chapter 2 discusses the main narratives in the *Metamorphoses* that feature speechlessness, those of Lycaon, Callisto, Io, Echo, Dryope, and Philomela. Chapter 3 discusses Ovid’s use of these myths in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae Ex Ponto* to emphasise the crisis involving his poetic identity and abilities. Chapter 4 concludes the book with an overview of recent work in memory studies; it then discusses Ovid’s efforts in his exile poetry to counteract his loss of a poetic community, which threatens his place in Roman memory as well as his ability to continue to create memory itself.

Bringing together the *Metamorphoses* and the exile poetry is a productive line of research. However, the argument overall is not convincing, and I find the book seriously flawed for several reasons. First of all, Natoli’s adoption of schema theory puts unnecessary constraint on the subtleties of Ovid’s poetry; second, the complete omission of the *Fasti*, a work revised in exile and intimately connected with constraints on speech, as Denis Feeney showed so well in his 1992 article (not cited in the bibliography), means that the author’s conclusions about speechlessness can be only partial; third, the

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work is very poorly edited and the translations are full of errors. I will take each point in turn.

First, schema theory creates a rigidity of interpretation. For instance, Natoli takes Lycaon as the paradigm for all subsequent metamorphoses in Ovid’s poetry. He skilfully shows how Ovid’s narrative particularly emphasises Lycaon’s loss of speech (pp. 35-7). However, he argues that Lycaon demonstrates that with metamorphosis, the inner essence of the person remains the same, despite a drastic change in form (pp. 7-8). Yet Lycaon has always, it seems, looked “wolfish” (eadem violentia vultus. . . eadem feritatis imago, Met. 1.238-9); according to Ovid’s text here, with the repeated eadem, Lycaon’s outer form coheres with his metamorphosed inner being. Moreover, as a paradigm, Lycaon does not work for Ovid’s Metamorphoses, a poem that resists neat classifications and involves change at all levels of the narrative. For instance, by contrast to Lycaon, Lycaon’s daughter Callisto loses her beauty when she becomes a bear and her inner self changes also, for she, a former huntress, now ironically experiences fear. To take another example, Philomela’s loss of speech. According to Natoli’s schema, speechlessness means becoming nonhuman and experiencing social isolation; thus Philomela on losing her tongue and her virginity moves into the animal realm (pp. 65-79). Yet far from being animal-like, during her captivity Philomela, though voiceless, uses her human ingenuity and a high level of art to weave a subtle but telling tapestry that can be conveyed without suspicion from the hut to her sister in the palace. Natoli also argues that when Philomela is released from imprisonment by her sister, she is (according again to his schema) therefore reintegrated into society and “reconnected with civilization and her family”. What civilization and what family, I have to ask, exists in the Thracian palace where Philomela’s family includes the brutal brother-in-law and the disposable nephew? The use of schema theory leads to the overriding of the complexities of Ovid’s narratives. And to turn to the exile poetry, surely Ovid there does not enter “into a speechless state” (p. 115) because he is separated from his poetic community, as Natoli argues; his existing poetry from exile suggests anxiety about loss of poetic abilities but not actual loss of articulate speech. Schema theory acts as a straitjacket on analysis of Ovid’s poetry.

Secondly, the Fasti, a late work intimately concerned with the issue of speech, is not part of the book’s discussion. (Nor, strangely, are the Heroides, although Ovid drew on them in exile and they too are concerned with social isolation and problems of communication). The Fasti, which was revised in exile and announces its exilic status in its opening proem to Germanicus, is generally agreed to overlap temporally and thematically with both the Metamorphoses and the Tristia and Epistulae Ex Ponto. Let me take one example of how failure to acknowledge the Fasti constrains Natoli’s argument. In his first chapter Natoli offers a schematic analysis of the word
mutus according to which the loss of articulate speech is associated with the subhuman and with emotionality (pp. 22-32); this definition is key to his subsequent analyses of Ovid’s poetry. Yet this schematic definition is complicated in Book 2 of the Fasti where Ovid introduces the goddess Muta (Fasti. 2.571-606). She is associated with magic, with cunning, deception and ingenuity; in Roman culture mutus clearly belongs to a richer semantic field than Natoli allows.

Third, the book is so poorly edited that it detracts from its arguments. It gives the impression of having been rushed to the press too soon, for there are editorial errors and translation errors on almost every page. I will give examples of just a few, beginning with some editorial errors.

Errors in transcription include “adultery” in place of adulter (p. 25); mugitus transcribed as “mugatus” (p. 59); nescius transcribed as “nesius” (p. 91) and dividior as “dividior” (p. 104, 203). There are grammatical errors also; for instance, “Inachus’ list. . . serve. . .” (p 65). Words are missing in sentences or letters from words, for instance, “bought” instead of “about” (p. 100); “the walls (of) the stables” (p. 102). The endnotes do not always correspond to the main text or are uninformative. For instance in note 22 of the Introduction Newlands (2014) should be Newlands (1998), which is not in the bibliography; in the same note the date of Hardie’s book is not given2. The formatting of elegiac couplets is sometimes askew (e.g. pp. 92-3); on p. 107 the translation of Tr. 1.2.33-36, provided on p. 106, is pasted in again as the translation for Tr. 1.2.53-6.

As regards the translations, from p. 80 on the provision of translation of the Latin text becomes erratic. Sometimes the Latin text is not translated; sometimes the translation is placed in the endnotes. Errors in translation include modern foreign languages; see e.g. the translation of ‘ungleichbar’ (p. 87) as ‘clearly’ at p. 202 n. 19 and also p. 47, n. 33 (pp. 192-3). But the errors in translating Latin are disturbingly persistent throughout, and range from basic errors to careless ones—e.g. at p. 86 the couplet cum subit illius tristissima noctis imago, / qua mihi supremum tempus in urbe fuit (Tr. 1.3.1-2) is repeated at p. 151 with quae instead of qua, yet in both instances the translation given is ‘on which’—to those that affect the interpretation. I point out a few of these here.

At p. 51, discussing the myth of Echo and Narcissus (in which vision as well as voice is obviously important), Natoli mistranslates aciem (Met. 3.381) as ‘high ground’ rather than ‘(eye)sight.’

In his discussion of the simile of the predatory bird in the myth of Procne, Philomela and Tereus, Natoli mistranslates deposuit nido leporem Iovis ales in alto (Met. 6.517) as ‘when the bird of love clutches a hare with its taloned feet in the bright heights’ (p. 67). Rather, Ovid’s variation on

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the conventional predatory simile suggests captivity with no possibility of escape, since the eagle has deposited the hare in its lofty (and thus inaccessible) nest.

The passage describing Philomela’s mutilated tongue is clumsily and inaccurately translated (pp 70-1) and the image of the tongue which “seeks the feet of its mistress as it dies” (*et moriens dominae vestigia quae riot*, becomes in Natoli’s translation “as if, in dying, it were searching for some sign of her”. The pointed *dominae* is not translated, and the clause has been made a conditional, diluting the graphic, physical image of dismemberment.

At p. 140 the epigraph *felices orment haec instrumenta libelllos* (*Tr. 1.1.9-10*) is translated in the endnote as “these decorations adorn happy little books” (p. 207). The omission of the subjunctive obviates the ironic contrast that the poet is making between poetry books published in Rome and his exile work. In that context too, *felices* would be more appropriately translated as “unfortunate” (echoing *infelix* at line 4) rather than as “happy”.

In general the translations lack polish and errors compound the problem of the author’s reliability as a guide to Ovid’s text. I provide a final example, Natoli’s translation of *Met.* 2. 489-92 offered at p. 101:

A! quotiens, sola non ausa quiescere silva,
ante domum quondamque suis erravit agris!
A! quotiens per saxa canum latratibus acta est
venatrixque metu venantum territa fugit!

‘Ah! How many times she did not dare to relax alone in the forest, she wandered into the fields before her former home! Ah! how many times she, a huntress, was driven through the rocks by the barking of dogs, and, terrified by the fear of the prey, fled!’

The failure to translate *ausa* as a past participle (having (not) dared) leads to awkward syntax in the translation; *in + abl. agris* is translated as ‘into’; in the final line the meaning is seriously skewed through the mistranslation of *venantum* (of the hunters) as the opposite, the prey! (In the following discussion of this passage Natoli refers to Callisto as standing before her home, ignoring *erravit*, 490).

An intratextual approach to Ovid’s poetry is to be welcomed. But it is a pity that the book is limited in scope, both in terms of the works discussed and in its theoretical approach. And it is a pity that the author and the press editors could not give more attention to proofreading the manuscript before it went to press.

**Carole E. Newlands**
University of Colorado Boulder
carole.newlands@colorado.edu