

Complete versions of Aulus Gellius had been published in Russian (1787), English (1795), French (1820 and thereafter), and German (1875–76) before he appeared in Spanish (1893); thereafter, although a bilingual Catalan edition reached book 9 in 1988, no further Castilian version was published till 2000, when the first volume of Amparo Gaos Schmidt’s translation, accompanying Giorgio Bernardi Perini’s reprinted text, saw the light in Mexico City; it now extends to book 16. Now another complete Castilian version has been published, followed by a translated anthology; these are both to be welcomed not only as further signs of life in Spanish classical philology, but also as evidence for the revival of interest in Gellius over the past few decades. Both are based on Marshall’s OCT, which was assuredly the best text of the Attic Nights when first published in 1968; unfortunately by the time of its reprint in 1990 it had already been overtaken by enhanced knowledge of the textual tradition due above all to Marshall himself, and should now be used in conjunction with the editions by Franco Cavazza (books 1–13 only) and Bernardi Perini.

Marcos Casqueros and Domínguez García (hereafter M.C.–D.G.) begin their introduction with a section “Roma en la época de Aulo Gellio”; as we should expect a peaceful, but uncreative era obsessed with the past. The due distinction is drawn between Greek Atticism and Latin archaism, if not sufficiently between the cultures as a whole: if the greatest intellectual achievement
of the age in Rome was the *Digesta* of Julian, in the Greek world it was the work of Galen. Yet the eyebrow must be raised by the assertion that “ese retorno de marchamo romántico hacia el pasado . . . se convierte en preocupación predominante cuando el aliento creador ha quedado exhausto”: the turn to the past of Renaissance culture was hardly the concomitant of an exhausted creative spirit, and the nineteenth-century Britain whose revival of the Middle Ages may be called romantic without anyone’s stopping to ask what the word means was the Britain of the Industrial Revolution, of political reform, of imperial expansion, and of a flourishing literary and artistic culture.

Rather than quibble over details (Favorinus survived at least into the 150s; Fronto is now known to have been consul in 142 not 143; not all the minor poets listed on p. 16 are demonstrably Hadrianic), I question whether Gellius’ portrait of Fronto should be placed on an evidential par with the surviving correspondence; if ‘Esta doctrina de Frontón es plenamente asumida por Gelio’, that is because Gellius has refashioned it to agree with his own principles. The correspondence shows no sign, in precept or practice, of linguistic purism; nor does it show any interest in Vergil, or much in Claudius Quadrigarius, for both of whom he is made to express admiration when Gellius comes visiting, but on the other hand displays a liking for Laberius that Gellius does not profess to share (though he enjoys pointing out his vulgarisms) and a fondness for Horace that he does not echo (despite a few possible allusions). But I cannot leave this section without raising an eyebrow at the judgement on Hadrianic poetry (p. 17), “Quizá el único poema de verdadero aliento poético sea el anónimo *Pervigilium Veneris*”; even Walter Pater took it only so far back as the Antonine age, a dating generally understood to be impossible for a poet, however inspired, who could so abuse the preposition *de* even before the debate between early and late fourth century was settled by Danuta Shanzer’s detection of Ausonius, *Cento nuptialis* 105–6, 110–1 Green at *Perv.* 25–6.1

We turn now to Gellius’ life and work; few surprises, but when we read (p. 22) that with such masters as his “no es extraño que las Noches Áticas . . . nos muestren una sociedad vacía y ficticia,” concerned only with futilities, we must ask whether the view from another window might have been different, and remember that Gellius dwelt in the world of books and not of public policy, for engaging with which he lacked not only the wealth and status but also (for a patron could have overcome those wants) the inclination. As for his masters, we may grant that Fronto shows not a vestige of political insight in his letters, and was no doubt content in his senatorial speeches to hit on the head whichever nail the emperor wished him to hit; but a Briton familiar with the barrister-MP who articulates none but second-hand opinions will not suppose the phenomenon to discriminate one era from another. By contrast Herodes was certainly a politician, albeit at Athens rather than Rome—and not quite a model of what such a man should be.

The editors take too literally Gellius’ claim to have followed the chance order of his annotations. These annotations are not to be envisaged as separate scraps of papyrus carefully dated and filed accordingly; rather, they were excerpts copied into sets of extracts headed either by source or by subject. From the manner in which quotations from the same work, and chapters on the same theme, are distributed, it is evident that these ordered notes have, as in other miscellanies, been deliberately shuffled in the writing-up because that is what the law of the genre prescribed.

Instead of attempting yet another classification of Gellius’ subject-matter (an enterprise always undertaken with anachronistic modern categories, rather than by asking whether a given topic concerned the grammaticus, the rhetor, the philosopher, or the jurist), the editors discuss the forms in which the information is imparted before turning to the style. Here they are unduly impressed by Mª Felisa del Barrio Vega’s downplaying of Gellius’ archaism: to be sure some archaisms, restored to educated use under Hadrian, could leach into the prose even of a Suetonius, but if Gellius had taken his ancient expressions from popular speech, we might expect to find imperfects in -ibam, which we know from Romance to have remained in use, rather than the Plautine aula of 17.8.2.5, which anybody else would have called an olla;
even in Romanian, which calls gold *aur*, a pot is *oală*. And to say (p. 32) “Gelio registra los arcaísmos para comentarlos, nunca como un elemento peculiar de su propia lengua,” though true in the sense that Gellius does not discuss his *propia lengua*, is to overlook that (as Hertz pointed out in 1873) more than once he uses archaisms on which he comments elsewhere.\(^2\)

A brief section on sources fails to conceal to the futility of most that has been written on the topic, and strangely counts Verrius Flaccus amongst those to whom Gellius accords great credit; to be sure he may have used him more than he admits, but his judgements fall well short of admiration.\(^3\) The bibliography (which turns Joannes Andreas de Buxis into “G. de Andrea,” presumably by confusion with the fourteenth-century canonist Joannes Andreeae) contains only five works later than 1989 and none later than 1998; the editions of sources are no more up to date, omitting such essentials as Kassel–Austin’s *Poetae comici Graeci* and the second edition of van den Hout’s Fronto, which is no mere corrected reprint. To list the errors in foreign languages would take too long, but not even names escape unscathed: Maxwell-Stuart becomes “Maswell-Stuart” and Gradenwitz “Grandenwitz.” As if in revenge for the past Italianization of Pedro Chacón as Ciacconi, Enrica Malcovati’s Italian article, “Favorinus o Favonius?,” is Hispanized by the prefixing of ñ.

Although florilegia of Gellius were compiled in the Middle Ages, and have more recently been made for schools, and although the few extracts (one ascribed to Ennius) in the *Documenta antiquorum* of Bartolomeo da San Concordio, O.P. (1262–1347) reappear in his Italian *Ammastramenti degli antichi*, the translated anthology is a genre first represented for our author by selections in French (“M. l’Abbé de V[erteuil],” 1776, with a sequel in 1777) and in German (“A. H. W. v. 2

W[alterstern],” 1785); after Italian and Hungarian specimens in the nineteenth century, the genre was revived in German by Heinz Berthold (1987). Now a Spanish sampling has appeared, by Francisco García Jurado (hereafter G.J.), who is known for his interest in the place of ancient authors, including Gellius, in cultural history. Sure enough, that is the main focus of both his introduction and his notes.

The introduction begins with a quotation from Arturo Capdevila’s poem “Aulo Gelio,” which brought Gellius to the sympathetic notice of other Argentinian writers, Bioy Casares, Borges, and Cortázar. Defending Gellius against the in truth antiquated charge of being a mere compiler, G.J. sees in the disparate and mostly short chapters of the *Attic Nights* the germ of the modern essay given “forma definitiva e imprevista” by Montaigne, for all its acknowledged debt to Seneca and Plutarch, even indeed in the injection of the subjective self; analysing Gellius’ various approaches to his authors and their texts—biographical anecdote, textual citation, critical engagement—he concludes that the true virtue of the miscellany is its openness. He then turns to the title *Noctes Atticae*, noting the numerous echoes and imitations since the Renaissance, and to the *capita rerum* following the preface, which, as Pliny had noted of his own contents-list, allow the reader to skip matters of less interest; a proceeding he deprecates in Gellius’ case as Italo Calvino had in Pliny’s. This seems paradoxical in the introduction to a florilegium, but if readers are thereby stimulated to take on the entire *Attic Nights* so much the better.

G.J. claims that his selection represents some third of Gellius’ work; since out of the 383 chapters preserved (not counting 8.1 and 8.15, partly known through Macrobius) he has chosen 70 chapters, this may surprise the more mathematical reader,

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4 In addition, chapters in which Fronto is a character have been included in translations of the latter; the grammatical chapters have by translated into Portuguese by Cleuza Cecato, *Comentários gramaticais de Aulo Gélio: uma proposta de tradução* (diss. Curitiba: Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2005), available online at http://dspace.c3sl.ufpr.br/dspace/bitstream/1884/7417/1/INTEIRO.pdf.
particularly as these are not always the longest. "Por razones editoriales" (meaning the will of Alianza Editorial?) they are divided into six categories: anecdotes concerning Alexander the Great and Philip (5 chapters); philosophers, their lives and ideas (20); poets and books (11); language and word-games (15); society (8); divination and some portents (11). Within each section, however, the chapters retain their original order, as in Walterstern’s selection; G.J.’s policy thus stands intermediate between wholesale reorganization (Verteuil 1776–77, Berthold 1987) and total non-interference (Felice Avetrani 1839). As to the manner of translation, he declares that his version is marked by simplicity and direct language, though not eschewing learned words from the Spanish literary tradition; that is a virtue in translating such a connoisseur of the savory archaism.

The introduction ends with a bibliographical section, in which attention will be drawn to the comment that the “traducción directa del latín” by Francisco Navarro y Calvo, canon of Granada, “nos consta” to be such. The true nature of this translation, which made so great an impression on Cortázar, and indeed on G.J., is betrayed by the very chapter that most engaged their interest, 5.7 on Gavius Bassus’ etymology of persona, where a personando enim id uocabulum factum esse coniectat is rendered “Cree que este vocablo toma su origen del verbo personare, retener.” What has resounding or making a piercing sound to do with retaining or holding back? The answer lies in the French version of 1842 made under the direction of Désiré Nisard: “Il croit que ce mot tire son origine du verbe personare, retentir”; Navarro y Calvo misread retentir as retenir. No doubt he satisfied his residue of conscience by glancing at the Latin text beneath the French and rendering uocabulum as vocablo instead of mot as palabra; but comparative examination will show that he has produced an almost literal rendering of the Nisard belle infidèle.5

If now we turn to the translations, we find that in general M.C.–D.G. are more literal, G.J. readier to recast Gellius’ style

5 See too 10.23.4–5, where adscripsi becomes “Je citerai”/“Citaré” and in qua . . . necare is transposed to §5.
into his own; thus at 5.2.1 Equus Alexandri regis et capite et nomine Bucephalus fuit M.C.–D.G. write “El caballo del rey Alejandro fue Bucéfalo de cabeza y de nombre”, G.J. “El caballo del rey Alejandro tenía el nombre de Bucéfalo por la forma de buey que tenía su cabeza”; similarly M.C.–D.G. render the passage from 5.7 cited above “supone que dicha palabra procede de personare” as against G.J.’s “mediante la interpretación de que proviene de personando «hacer resonar».” An exception is furnished by the triad pr. 5 uariam et miscellam et confusaneam doctrinam, which M.C.–D.G. translate “una serie de conocimientos variados, dispares y heterogéneos”, G.J. “una doctrina variada, miscelánea y, por así decirlo, «confusánea»,” with a note on Gellius’ neologism, imitated with just such an apology as he and other Roman writers sometimes offer for their calques on Greek. He thus goes halfway to imitating Gellius’ combination of a commonplace, an archaic, and a newly created word.

Triads apart, Gellius is even fonder than other Latin authors of pairing words, as in the very first sentence of his first book:

‘Plutarchus in libro quem de Herculis, quamdiu inter homines fuit, animi corporisque ingenio atque uirtutibus conscriptis, scite subtiliterque ratiocinatum Pythagoram philosophum dicit in reperienda modulandaque status longitudinis que eius praestantia.’

Mind and body are a constant couple (cf. 3.1.5); ingenio atque uirtutibus is a hendiadys, indicating that Hercules’ natural qualities are praiseworthy; the rest are synonym pairs, “cleverly and subtly,” “finding and measuring,” “stature and height,” which require the translator to decide whether or not they are to be retained. M.C.–D.G. render:

En el libro que escribió Plutarco sobre la naturaleza física y espiritual de Hércules mientras estuvo entre los hombres dice que el filósofo Pitágoras estableció unos razonamientos muy sabios y sutiles para calcular y medir su elevada estatura.
Atque uirtutibus and longitudinisque are simply discarded; the other pairs are retained. G.J. offers:

Plutarco, en el libro que escribió sobre Hércules, acerca de cuánto tiempo pasó entre los hombres, sobre las cualidades de su alma y de su cuerpo, además de sus virtudes, nos cuenta que el filósofo Pitágoras razonó de manera atinada y sutil a la hora de hallar y determinar la estatura del héroe y su excepcional altura.

Nothing is lost, though atque uirtutibus and longitudinisque are separated from their partners; only hallar y determinar remains as a pair. For some reason fuit is rendered as if it were fuerit, so that the temporal clause becomes an indirect question and a second sobre is needed.

Thereafter, whereas M.C.–D.G. retain the structure of §2 as a single long sentence, G.J. breaks it into two; his greater freedom extends into §3, where tanto fuisse Herculem corpore excelsiorem, rendered “que la estatura de Hércules fue tanto mayor” by M.C.–D.G., becomes “que Hércules fue más corpulento.” To be sure, Hercules was bulkier all over than other men, not merely a bean-pole, but nevertheless it is only of height that Gellius speaks; G.J.’s freedom sometimes exceeds his accuracy. However, it is on both translations that the false friend modificatus est works its deception: “hizo las modificaciones” (M.C.–D.G.), “modificó” (G.J.), though the word means not “modified” but “calculated.”

There are certain passages that have caused numerous translators to stumble, such as 15.2.3, where the young men in Athens celebrate a banquet hebdomadibus lunae, that is on their especial god Apollo’s birthday on the seventh day of each Athenian lunar month; the use of ἑβδομάς for ἑβδόμη is foreign to classical Attic, and therefore perhaps to Latinists, more at home with its Christian use for “week” and insufficiently acquainted with the biography of Apollo. M.D.–D.G. write “las semanas en que se festejaba solennemente a la luna,” without explaining what these might have been; G.J. presents “cada semana lunar,” which at least is easier to understand than Marache’s “aux hebdomades lunaires.” The correct translation, “il settimo giorno
largely about the difficulties found in the quotations from Cato at 10.23.4–5. The first cannot be translated until the punctuation has been determined:

“Vir” inquit “cum divorciat fecit mulier iudex pro censore est imperium quod uidetur habet si quid perverse taetreque factum est a muliere multatur si vinum bibit si cum alieno uiro probri quid fecit condemnatur.”

(i) Since the tense of fecit shows that the divorce has already taken place, the uir, still a man but no longer a husband, has no power whatever over the mulier, who is no longer his wife; therefore it must be exerted by the iudex; and that is how Gellius understood the clause in §3, “sed Marcus Cato non solum exsistimatas, set et multatas quoque a iudice mulieres refert non minus si uinum in se quam si probrum et adulterium admississent”. We should therefore punctuate after fecit but not uir, which is the subject of fecit not est.

(ii) Is multatur the apodosis of si factum est or of bibit? If we seek guidance from Gellius’ paraphrase, we find it apparently related both to bibit and to fecit, as if condemnatur did not follow; but since his point is that wine and adultery were on a par, he must have taken the two clauses together. Whether he was right to do so is another question: execution of wives in regal times is recorded at Plin. NH 14. 89, but in the next section we read: “Cn. Domitius iudex pronuntiauit mulierem uideri plus uini bibisse quam ualitudinis causa, uiro insciente, et dote multavit”; however, as Sblendorio Cugusi observes, by taking multatur with factum est and si uinum bibit with

Frr. 200–1 in Maria Teresa Sblendorio Cugusi’s edition of Cato’s Orationum reliquiae (Torino 1982) and in vol. i of the complete Opere edited by her and Paolo Cugusi (Torino 2001).
condemnatur (that is, by punctuating factum est; si uinum bibit, si ...) we obtain a characteristic “struttura giuridica.”

M.C.–D.G. render:

Dice: “Cuando el marido ha decidido el divorcio, se convierte en juez de su mujer, como podría serlo el censor, y tiene, a lo que parece, poder absoluto sobre ella: si la mujer ha cometido alguna acción perversa y deshonrosa, la castiga; si bebió vino o si realizó actos deshonestos con otro hombre, la condena.”

Their attempt to rescue the husband-judge by finessing the tense of the first fecit seems to come straight from Marache (“L’homme qui a décidé le divorce”), whom they also more reasonably follow in taking multatur with the second (“si la femme a commis une action perverse ou honteuse il la punit”); as a result, when quod uidetur (“as he sees fit”) is translated twice over, first wrongly (“a lo que parece”), then rightly (“absoluto”), one wonders whether they were trying to make sense of Marache’s “une sorte de pouvoir absolu.”

G.J. also treats Vir as the subject of est; he renders the first fecit as if it were facit, and follows Marshall in construing multatur with bibit:

“Cuando un marido se divorcia de su mujer”, nos dice, “es juez para con ésta como si fuera un censor y tiene poder sobre ella en caso de que ésta haya actuado de manera vergonzosa y oscura; será multada si bebe vino, y condenada si ha cometido adulterio con otro hombre”.

Quod uidetur has been omitted, and (de manera) oscura seems over-gentle for taetre in a moral context; the future será multada may be justified in free translation, but bebe is

7 The natural translation in Spanish as in English, but Gaos Schmidt more exactly writes “con quien no es su marido”; cum alieno uiro is properly “a man who is not hers” (not “another’s man,” since the lover may not be married).
certainly wrong, for the context shows *bibt* to be perfect. The second fragment, in §5, runs:

‘In adulterio uxorem tuam si prehendisses, sine iudicio inpune necares; illa te, si adulterares sive tu adulterarere, digito non auderet contingere, neque ius est.’

In M.C.–D.G.’s version, this becomes:

Si has sorprendido a tu esposo en adulterio, puedes matarla impunemente sin juicio; pero no se atreverá a tocarte con el dedo si tú cometes adulterio [o te has dejado seducir]; no tiene derecho.

Once again they echo Marache in reverting to the old hypothesis of interpolation, and in naively mistranslating the passive of *adultero*; the only difference is that he understands an ideal not an open condition (‘ou si tu te laissais séduire”), which at least recognizes that the verbs are uniformly subjunctive. But if Cato had intended the ideal condition, he would have written *si prehenderis* [perfect subjunctive] . . . *neces* . . . *adulteres* . . . *audeat*;⁸ instead he used the historic tenses, which belong to the *irrealis*. Since the ideal second person makes no sense in such a context, *tu* must be the opponent; since it would be pointless to imagine him currently in the bedroom when he is manifestly in court, the imperfect subjunctive must, as often in Early Latin, pertain not to the present but the past: that is to say, *necares* corresponds to classical *necauisses*, which was indeed available to Cato but would have obliterated the priority, however slight, between the catching, expressed by the relative tense *prehendisses*, and the killing: “If you had caught your wife in adultery, you would not have been punished for putting her to death without a trial; but she, if you were penetrating [another

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⁸ In an open condition relating to an ideal second person, he would have retained the protatic subjunctives, but in the apodoses written *necabis* and *audebit*; if he were addressing the opponent, the protases would have been in the indicative, *prehenderis adulterabis adulterabere.*
person than her, whether male or female] or being penetrated [by another man], would not have dared lay a finger on you, nor is it lawful [for a wife] to do so.”

The basic meaning of *adultero* < *adaltero* is “alter,” therefore (cf. Spanish *alterar*, French *altérer*) “spoil,” and hence specifically “deprive of pudicitia,” be the object a woman or what is called a passive man.

In G.J.’s version once again the unreal past goes unrecognized:

Si encontraras a tu esposa cometiendo adulterio, le darás muerte impunemente sin necesidad de juicio; en caso de que tú cometeras adulterio o fueras objeto de éste, que no se atreva a tocarte ni con un dedo, ni tenga derecho alguno.

I am not sure that a man’s being the object of adultery, in a modern language, amounts to being penetrated; and though “let her not dare” might be a legitimate freedom if the type of condition were appropriate, I do not understand what “nor [let her] have any right” may mean. But at least G.J. is not seduced by Marache. Nor is he at 5.17.5, correctly interpreting *Sextiles “de Agosto*” where M.C.–D.G. render “de Julio” after Marache’s “de juillet.”

To concentrate now on chapters that M.C.–D.G. alone translate, at 2.27.1 they adopt another of Marache’s mistakes, taking ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας with what precedes instead of what follows: “contra quien combatimos por el poder y la hegemonía” ~ “contre qui nous combattons pour le pouvoir et la domination.”

This was in retrospect the Roman view of the Second Punic War, but it was certainly not Demosthenes’ view of the Athenian struggle against Philip; indeed, it was the suspicion that Athens was simply attempting to resume her old imperialism that proved so harmful to her attempts at building up an anti-Macedonian

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9 In English we might say “nor would she have had the right to do so,” since only if the condition had been realized would the question have arisen; but Latin uses the indicative because the law is thus in any case, the present because the law is thus, not merely used to be.
alliance. We may add that Marache’s imperfect is better than M.C.–D.G.’s preterite, since the fighting was in progress at the time of the observation. However, they do not follow him into error at the end of the extract, correctly writing “con el resto de su cuerpo” (τῷ λοιπῷ) for his “le reste de sa vie.”

At 3.10.13, on the other hand, though adopting in their note Marache’s reference to Censorinus and his explanation of τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνίαν in a chapter on the number seven, namely that there are four notes and three intervals, they spurn his correct translation, “l’accord de quarte,” and write instead “la sinfonía de los cuatro,” where the corresponding term for the octave, ἡ διὰ πασῶν, shows even the gender to be wrong: it is the consonance across/over the four strings, las cuatro cuerdas. At 5.9.6, where Marshall, like his predecessors but not his successors, prints inter ipsos et adversarios, it is Rolfe whom they follow, rendering ipsos as “los samios,” which would have been expressed as ciues ipsius; in fact the true reading must be ipsum, known from certain Quattrocento manuscripts but already restored some two hundred years earlier in MS C (Cambridge, Clare College 26),\textsuperscript{10} a manuscript known since 1905 but not brought to Gellian scholars’ attention till 1980.\textsuperscript{11} Like both Rolfe and Marache’s continuator Julien they take glosaria 17.7.3 to be “glosarios” instead of γλωσσάρια, and like the latter they interpret ἐπισημαίνεσθαι §4 of bad temper (“en un humor de perros” ~ “de bien mauvaise humeur”) even though they cite Marshall’s article demonstrating the sense to be “present the symptoms.” Once again Bernardi Perini is right: “glossette,” “in preda a un attacco.”

\textsuperscript{10} Greek games did not include team-sports, and even if they had ipsos could hardly mean “his team” (“son équipe” Marache); naturally the emender knew nothing about ancient athletics, but could attach no meaning to ipsos and therefore corrected it.

As is normal in translations, M.C.–D.G. offer what they consider to be the bare minimum of annotation required for the reader to understand a topic and take it further; by and large they serve those purposes, though no two scholars will ever agree on what is essential and what is not. There are some surprises, both of presence and of absence; at 2.21.7 the discussion of dies atri has nothing to do with the suffix of quinquatrus, and seems to have strayed from 5.17; at 2.22.29 they do not identify Cato’s great salt mountain as that of Cardona, though to be fair not even the Catalan translator Cebrià Montserrat did.

G.J. declares that his notes are not meant to be a learned commentary, but to put the chapters into a relation with other texts before, of, or after Gellius’ own day. Indeed, they abound in literary parallels ancient and modern: thus at p. 55 n. 2, on 7.8, tales of Alexander and the elder Africanus, there are references to 12.11.7 (Truth the daughter of Time), Nicolás Antonio’s Censura de historias fabulosas, Plutarch’s life of Alexander, and the Gesta Romanorum; at pp. 92–3 n. 23, on 13.5, after quoting Feijoo, G.J. contrasts Aristotle’s success and Alexander’s failure in nominating an heir. At p. 204 n. 16, the Milesian suicide-wave of 15.10, one would have welcomed discussion of real-life instances such as have occurred in recent years; nevertheless, G.J.’s notes may be likened for the comparisons they offer and the thoughts they arouse to those of other versions made with literary rather than philological intentions, such as those by Verteuil, Walterstern, and Gellius’ first published English translator William Beloe.

In sum, for all the fault-finding natural to readers of the original reviewing translations and scholars reviewing men of letters, I do not hesitate to say the Spanish reader is as well served by these two translations as anyone has the right to expect, and that therefore in the divulgation of his work Gellius is well served too.

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